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GATEKEEPER FAILURE AND REFORM:
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms
by John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Abstract
Securities markets have long employed Agatekeepers@ - - independent professions
who pledge their reputational capital - - to protect dispersed investors. This
strategy of relying on reputational intermediaries to assess, verify and certify the
corporate issuer=s disclosures appears to have failed during the late 1990s, as
accounting irregularities increased exponentially. Part I of this paper assesses the
reasons for this failure, emphasizing both a shortfall in deterrence and the sudden
shift from a cash-based to an equity-based system of executive compensation
during the 1990s. Part II and III then survey the realistic regulatory options and
the incomplete steps taken by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Breaking down these
options into four categories - - structural rules, prophylactic rules, procedural
rules, and liability-enhancing rules - -, Part III concludes that simply increasing
the threat of liability could cause the market for gatekeeping services to fail.
Instead, it proposes a shift towards stricter liability standards coupled with a
ceiling on gatekeeper liability set at a level adequate to deter misconduct, but not
to compensate investors. Finally, Part III proposes that the role of a new
gatekeeper needs to be recognized and formalized: namely, the attorney who
prepares a disclosure document, who should, it argues, be forced to provide a
functionally parallel certification with regard to this issuer=s non-financial
disclosures to the certification provided by the auditor with respect to financial
disclosures. The feasibility and scope of such a certification requirement, along
with its impact on the attorney=s other obligations to its client, are explored in Part
III.
Securities markets have long employed “gatekeepers” - - independent
professionals who pledge their reputational capital - - to protect the interests of
dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action.1 The clearest
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Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School, and Director,
Columbia Law School Center on Corporate Governance.
Probably, the first systematic use of this term, “gatekeeper,” was in an article by
Ronald Gilson and Ranier Kraakman. See Ronald Gilson and Ranier Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 612-621 (1984)
(discussing role of investment bankers as gatekeepers). See also John C. Coffee,
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examples of such reputational intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts,
who in different ways verify or assess corporate disclosures in order to advise
investors. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly failed, and a
unique concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common
denominator of accounting irregularities. What caused this sudden outburst of
scandals, involving a seeming epidemic of accounting and related financial
irregularities, that broke over the financial markets between late 2001 and mid2002 - - e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco and others? To date,
much commentary has broadly and loosely attributed these scandals to any or all
of: (1) a stock market bubble; (2) a decline in business morality; (3) weak boards
of directors;2 or (4) an increase in “infectious greed.”3 Without denying that any
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Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internent on Modern Securities
Regulation, 52 Bus. Law. 1195, 1210-13, 1232-33 (1999). For a fuller discussion
of the concept of gatekeepers as “reputational intermediaries,” see text and notes
infra at notes 9 to 11. The use of such private agents substantially predates the
appearance of public regulation, either the federal securities laws or the state
“Blue Sky” laws. The New York Stock Exchange began to require the
publication of financial statements certified by an independent auditor around
1900, well before the passage of the first “Blue Sky” statute. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 37-39 (2001).
For a representative such statement, see Stuart L. Gillan and John D. Martin,
“Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance and the Collapse of Enron”
(SSRN Working Paper id=350040) (2002) at 3 (finding first cause of Enron’s
breakdown to have been “a lack of board independence and board oversight”). In
contrast, this paper doubts the adequacy of such an explanation. Admittedly,
boards did fail, and even a special committee of Enron’s own board has
concluded that the Enron board failed to monitor officers for conflicts of interest
adequately. See William C. Powers, Jr. et al., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002), 2002 WL 198018. Similarly, a
Senate Subcommittee has assigned the principal blame to the Enron Board. See
3

of these factors could have played some role, this article begins from the premise
that explanations phrased in terms of greed and morality are unsatisfactory
because they depend on subjective trends that cannot be reliably measured.
Even explanations that involve critiques of corporate governance involve
a related problem in that they fail to account for the sudden increase in financial
irregularity. While some boards certainly failed, the overall independence and
power of outside directors has only increased over recent years, and the 20012002 epidemic of financial irregularity cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms
of any recent decline in board performance. To explain an epidemic of
irregularity, one must identify some force or factor that changed - - either
intensifying or weakening - - so that its influence can account for the overall shift
in behavior, and clearly the board’s performance, even if inadequate, did not
decline materially over the relevant interval of the 1990s.
A final oversimple explanation is that a “few bad apples”- - i.e., a small
group of “rogue managers” who were corrupt - - caused these scandals. This
explanation overlooks
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Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee of
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, “The Role of the Board of Directors
in Enron’s Collapse,” (Report 107-70) (July 8, 2001). Nonetheless, such studies
beg the larger question: why did these boards fail now and not earlier? Although
board procedure or independence may have been deficient, they were almost
certainly superior to a decade ago when such scandals were rare.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan coined this colorful phrase, saying
that “An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business community.” See
Floyd Norris, “The Markets: Market Place: Yes, He Can Top That,” New York
Times, July 17, 2002, at A-1.
4

the pervasiveness of the sudden surge in financial irregularities in the late 1990s.
As will be seen, approximately 10% of all publicly listed U.S. companies restated
their financial statements at least once between 1997 and June 2002,4 and the
annual rate of financial restatements soared during the latter half of the 1990s.5
Such financial irregularity is, of course, characteristic of a bubble, and little doubt
now exists that a large frothy bubble burst in 2000-2001. As a historical matter,
bubbles tend to produce scandals and, in turn, prophylactic legislation,6 but this
loose generalization leaves unanswered the critical questions: what caused this
bubble and how does the growth of a bubble relate to the apparent breakdown of
our once-confident system of corporate governance?
This article will focus on an alternative explanation for the wave of
accounting and financial reporting irregularities that surfaced in 2001-2002:
namely, that the gatekeepers failed. That is, the professionals who serve investors
by preparing, verifying, or certifying corporate disclosures to the securities
markets acquiesced in managerial fraud - - not in all cases, to be sure, but at a
markedly higher rate than during the immediately preceding period. While the

4
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6

See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, FINANCIAL
STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory
Responses and Remaining Challenges (Oct. 2002) (GAO-03-138) at 4
(hereinafter, “GAO Study”).
See text and notes infra at notes 18 to 24.
Professor Stuart Banner has argued that, over the last 300 years, most major
instances of legislation regulating the securities markets have followed a
sustained price collapse on the securities market. See Stuart Banner, What
Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence, 75 Wash. U. L.Q.
849, 850 (1997).
5

concept of gatekeeper will be discussed and refined later, this term certainly
includes the auditors, securities analysts, and securities attorneys who prepare,
review, or analyze disclosure documents. Part I of this article develops
competing, but complimentary, explanations for gatekeeper failure. The behavior
of gatekeepers cannot be examined in isolation, but rather appears to have been
significantly influenced by the incentives that drove corporate managers over the
same period. To this extent, the recent explosion of financial irregularity was less
the product of ineffable factors - - such as “infectious greed” or mass irrationality
- - than the natural and logical consequence of trends and forces that had been
developing for some time. Ironically, the blunt truth is that both the recent
accounting scandals and the broader phenomenon of earnings management were
the by-products of a system of corporate governance that has indeed made
corporate managers more accountable to the market. Sensitivity to the market,
however, can be a mixed blessing - - particularly when the market becomes
euphoric and uncritical. As a result, a corporate governance system that was
adequate for a world in which the agents’ incentives to act opportunistically were
weaker failed when these same agents - - managers, gatekeepers and financial
intermediaries - - responded to stronger incentives and rationally pursued their
own self-interests to the detriment of shareholders.
Part I will conclude that the factor that most destabilized our
contemporary corporate governance system was the sudden change in executive
compensation during the 1990s. As executive compensation shifted to being
6

equity-based, instead of cash-based, a greatly enhanced incentive arose for
managers to manipulate earnings - - and to induce their gatekeepers to let them.
To this extent, blaming the board is a myopic theory of causation that leads
nowhere, because it does not explain the sudden surge in irregularities. In truth,
in most cases, boards cannot detect earnings manipulation in the absence of
warnings from their professional gatekeepers.
While Part I offers a diagnosis, it proposes no prescription. Part II
approaches this task by first mapping the range of strategies available to
regulators. Basically, it groups the realistic regulatory options for dealing with
conflicts of interest under four headings: (1) structural rules; (2) prophylactic
rules; (3) procedural rules, and (4) liability-enhancing rules. Seeking to curb the
conflicts of interest that compromised auditors and analysts, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,7 passed by Congress in response to the wave of corporate scandals
that crested in 2002, utilizes all these strategies - - except the last. Although
enhancing liability rules is probably the most obvious and traditional response to
scandals, this was also the one strategy that business interests effectively resisted
during the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Ironically, however, even though
Congress has not used this technique, courts today appear to have enhanced the
risk of legal liability on their own through the creative reinterpretation of
ambiguous doctrines.

7

Technically, this statute is entitled the “Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002,” 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq., 107 Pub. L. No. 204,
116 Stat. 745.
7

But therein lies a host of problems. Although gatekeepers need to face
some legal threat to keep them faithful to shareholders, the optimal level of
deterrence is much harder to estimate. An “excessive” threat may both impair the
financial viability of gatekeepers, even closing down the market for gatekeeping
services, and impede the ability of many corporations to recruit qualified, outside
directors. Part II therefore assesses the magnitude of the litigation “threat” that is
now developing as a prelude to suggesting other reforms that may be desirable
because they seek to modify gatekeeper behavior by means that do not threaten
the solvency of gatekeepers.
Finally, Part III proposes alternative reforms intended to make gatekeepers
more responsive to the interests of investors. Initially, Part III evaluates a
possible model under which auditors should face heightened liability, but with
their maximum exposure capped at a multiple of their expected revenue from the
client that would be sufficient to achieve adequate deterrence. The attraction of
this combination is that it combines the better incentives of strict liability with a
system that both places a realistic ceiling on the gatekeeper’s aggregate liability
and minimizes the transaction costs associated with enforcement. Concededly,
this proposal subordinates the goal of compensation to that of deterrence, but
gatekeepers are simply not of the economic scale to be able to fund significant
compensation to investors, particularly in the new era of mega-litigation. This
proposed approach also reduces reliance that must be placed on courts for costly
and unpredictable liability determinations. Most importantly, by moving towards
8

a strict liability system, this proposal eliminates the incentive for auditors to
rationalize or overlook fraud or irregularity and later assert that they were
deceived by management. Thus, it enhances auditor performance without risking
collapse of the market for auditing services.
Part III recognizes, however, that all gatekeepers are not alike, that
critical distinctions exist between auditors and attorneys in terms of their typical
functional activity, and that a model appropriate for one gatekeeper need not be
appropriate for all. In that light, Part III does not propose strict liability for
attorneys, but instead a structural reform: namely, imposing gatekeeper
responsibilities on attorneys to monitor their corporation’s disclosures, with a
special emphasis on non-financial disclosures. In principle, the attorney should
be given a funcionally similar responsibility for non-financial disclosures as the
auditor now has for financial disclosures. Easy as this is to say, the devil lies in
the details. Specifically, Part III responds by outlining a certification
requirement, an enhanced independence standard for special contexts, and a due
diligence obligation under which the SEC could suspend or disbar securities
attorneys who failed negligence or malpractice tests. To be sure, the SEC has
already begun to move modestly and tentatively in this same direction by
adopting an “up-the-ladder” internal reporting requirement under which attorneys
must report evidence of a material violation of law that they acquire in their
representation of the corporation to the corporation’s general counsel or, if

9

necessary, its audit committee.8 While important, this requirement deals only
with a special context (violations of law) and does not create, as the proposed
reforms would, a generalized obligation for at least a certifying attorney to
monitor the accuracy of the corporation’s non-financial disclosures.
Of course, any claim that the attorney is, or should be, a gatekeeper, will
trigger predictable responses from the bar that such a role conflicts with the other
roles that attorneys perform or that it will dry up the flow of information between
attorneys and clients. Part III assesses and rejects these arguments, concluding
that the principal consequence of expressly recognizing attorneys as gatekeepers
will be instead to enhance their leverage with their clients. In short, the
unrecognized consequence of expanded ethical or professional obligations is to
empower the gatekeeper, thus responding appropriately to the phenomenon of
“gatekeeper failure.”
Part I: Gatekeepers: Past and Present
A. Defining the Concept. The term “gatekeeper” has been widely used to
refer to the outside professionals who serve the board or investors.9 Two core
ideas underlie the concept of gatekeeper, and it is important to distinguish

8
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See Securities Act Release No. 33-8185 (“Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys”) (February 6, 2003); see also text and notes
infra at notes 126 to 130.
The SEC regularly uses this term. See Securities Act Release No. 7870 (June 30,
2000) (noting that “the federal laws....make independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to
the public securities markets”). 2000 SEC LEXIS 1389, *13; see also Securities
Act Release No. 7314 (July 25, 1996) (discussing “The Role of Gatekeepers in
Maintaining the Quality of Disclosure”).
10

between them: First, the gatekeeper is a person who has significant reputational
capital, acquired over many years and many clients, which it pledges to assure the
accuracy, or at least the honesty, of statements or representations that it either
makes or verifies. Second, the gatekeeper receives a far smaller benefit or payoff
for its role, as an agent, in approving, certifying, or verifying information than
does the principal from the transaction that the gatekeeper facilitates or enables.
Thus, because of this lesser benefit, a lesser expected penalty should be sufficient
to deter. This latter premise applies even if the gatekeeper has no reputational
capital. Yet, from both perspectives, the presence of gatekeepers increases the
prospects for deterrence and law compliance.
The term “gatekeeper” has also been used more broadly to refer to any
person or entity who provides a necessary service or certification without which
the corporation cannot accomplish a transaction.10 This may accurately describe
their organizational position, but it seems overly broad because it ignores both the
deterrent capacity of the gatekeeper and whether it possesses reputational capital.
Under this broader definition, Microsoft might become a “gatekeeper” for most of
the business world (on the assumption that its basic Windows technology was
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Professor Reinier Kraakman has defined “gatekeepers” as private parties who are
able to prevent misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.
See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986); see also Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 (1984). This
definition strikes me as much too broad, at least for purposes of discussing the
role of professionals. It would potentially hold liable persons who sold pencils to
Al Capone’s gang on the grounds that one could not run a brewery and tavern
business without using pencils to keep records.
11

indispensable). Thus, this article will use the term “gatekeeper” more narrowly to
mean a reputational intermediary who provides verification or certification
services to investors. Still, the focus on the gatekeeper’s role in providing a
necessary service or certification is useful, because it suggests a regulatory
strategy on which this article will focus: by mandating gatekeepers, the law can
maximize the probability of deterrence by creating a necessary actor whose
compliance with the law it can more effectively influence.
Obvious examples of gatekeepers who provide such verification or
certification services would include: (1) the auditor providing its certification of
the issuer’s financial statements; (2) the debt rating agency certifying the issuer’s
creditworthiness (or relative creditworthiness); (3) the security analyst providing
its objective assessment of the corporation’s technology, competitiveness, or
earnings prospects; (4) the investment banker providing its “fairness opinion” as
to the pricing of a merger; and (5) the securities attorney for the issuer providing
its opinion to the underwriters that all material information of which it is aware
concerning the issuer has been properly disclosed. The underwriter in an initial
public offering is probably also a gatekeeper in the sense that its reputation is
implicitly pledged and it is expected to perform due diligence services. Some
professions (most notably, the auditor) provide services that consist primarily of
gatekeeping, whereas other professions engage in such services only as an
ancillary activity (for example, as discussed later, the attorney is primarily an
advocate or a transaction engineer and only sometimes a gatekeeper).
12

Characteristically, the professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or
vouches for the corporate client=s own statements about itself or a specific
transaction. This duplication is desired because the market recognizes that the
gatekeeper has a lesser incentive to deceive than does its client and thus regards
the gatekeeper=s assurance or evaluation as more credible. Unavoidably, the
gatekeeper as a watchdog is compromised to a degree by the fact that it is
typically paid by the party that it is to monitor. Still, the gatekeeper’s relative
credibility stems from the fact that it in effect pledges a reputational capital that it
has built up over many years of performing similar services for numerous clients.
In theory, the gatekeeper as an entity would not rationally sacrifice its
reputational capital for a single client or a modest fee.
Nonetheless, here as elsewhere, logic and experience can conflict.
Despite the clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale, reliance on gatekeepers can
prove to have been misplaced for any of the following reasons:
(1) There could be a sudden decline in the deterrent threat facing
gatekeepers, thereby increasing their willingness to take legal risks;
(2) The inducements offered to gatekeepers to breach their duties could
similarly be increased, with the same likely result;
(3) The value of reputational capital could decline, possibly because
investors came to place less weight on gatekeeping services in a “bubble market;”
(4) The prospective injury to a gatekeeper’s reputational capital from
involvement in a scandal could also decline, possibly because, in a very
13

concentrated market (such as the market for auditing services), it becomes
forseeable that all the principal firms in the market will be involved in some
scandals and hence investors cannot distinguish meaningfully among them (i.e.,
the information costs become too high for ordinary investors); or
(5) Principal/agent problems can arise within gatekeeper firms with the
result that agents can rationally decide to risk the firm’s reputational capital to a
degree that the firm as a whole would not. This decision to risk reputational
capital that primarily belongs to others may be rational for the agent, but not for
the firm.
For all these reasons, professional gatekeepers may sometimes acquiesce in
managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses seem to dwarf the
gains to be made from the individual client.11
Much evidence corroborates each of the foregoing hypotheses and
suggests that the “few bad apples” theory is simply incorrect as applied to the
performance of gatekeepers in the late 1990s. Still, if we shift from theory to the
world of real actors, the facts surrounding Arthur Andersen’s fall in 2002. In
theory, Andersen should not have acquiesced in accounting irregularities, because
it had many clients, each of whom pay a fee that was modest in proportion to the
firm=s overall revenues. Specifically, Arthur Andersen had approximately 2,300
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This observation is hardly original with this author. See, for example, Robert A.
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1333 (2000).
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audit clients.12 On this basis, the firm seemingly had little incentive to risk its
considerable reputational capital for any one client, even if that client paid a
multi-million dollar fee. As will be seen however, each of the foregoing
hypothesis can contribute to an explanation of gatekeeper failure.
Nonetheless, during the 1990s, many courts bought the logic that
gatekeepers do not fail hook, line and sinker. For example, in DiLeo v. Ernst &
Young,13 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, outlined precisely
the foregoing theory:
“The complaint does not allege that [the auditor]
had anything to gain from any fraud by [its client].
An accountant=s greatest asset is its reputation for
honesty, closely followed by its reputation for
careful work. Fees for two years= audits could not
approach the losses [that the auditor] would suffer
from a perception that it would muffle a client=s
fraud .... [The auditor=s] partners shared none of the
gain from any fraud and were exposed to a large
fraction of the loss. It would have been irrational
for any of them to have joined cause with [the
client].”14
Of course, the modest fees in some of these cases (for example, the audit fee was
only $90,000 in Robin v. Arthur Young & Co.)15 were well less than the $100
million in prospective annual fees from Enron that Arthur Andersen & Co.
explicitly foresaw. But this difference in magnitude cannot really explain Arthur
12
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14
15

See Michelle Mittelstadt, AAndersen Charged With Obstruction, Vows to Fight,@
Dallas Morning News, March 15, 2002, at p.1.
901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th
Cir. 1994); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990)
(mere $90,000 annual audit fee would have been an irrational motive for fraud).
See Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d at 629.
See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co,, 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir 1990).
15

Andersen=s collapse. Even if Arthur Andersen saw Enron as a potential $100
million client, it must be remembered that Arthur Andersen generated over $9
billion in revenues in 2001 alone (so that its expected Enron revenues would total
only around 1% of its aggregate revenues).16 Hence, a fuller explanation seems
necessary.
B. The Auditing Profession During the 1990s: A Study in Transition
Once among the most respected of all professionals service firms
(including law, accounting, and consulting firms), Andersen became involved in a
series of now well-known securities frauds - - e.g., Waste Management, Sunbeam,
HBOCMcKesson, The Baptist Foundation, and Global Crossing - - that
culminated in its disastrous association with Enron. Those who wish to view the
recent corporate scandals as simply the work of a “few bad apples” may seek to
characterize Arthur Andersen as a deviant firm, in effect an “outlaw” that
masqueraded as an honest sheriff. This theory, however, simply does not hold
water. The available evidence in fact suggests that, in terms of the percentage of
accounting restatements experienced by its audit clients, Andersen was not
significantly different from its peers and experienced the same (or lesser) rate of
financial restatements.17 To the extent it was different, the leading difference may
16
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Arthur Andersen=s website reports that revenues for 2001 were $9.34 billion. See
www.andersen.com. Also, the $100 million figure was the expected revenue per
year that Andersen partners foresaw in the future, when overall revenues would
presumably also increase.
Compared to its peers within the Big Five accounting firms, Arthur Andersen
appears to have been responsible for a less than its proportionate share of
earnings restatements. While it audited 21% of Big 5 audit clients, it was
responsible for only 15% of the restatements experienced by the Big Five firms
16

have been only that it was less lucky. All in all, the more logical inference to
draw from the “accounting irregularity” scandals of 2001-2002 is that an erosion
in the quality of financial reporting occurred sometime during the 1990s.
Indeed, this is the area where the data seems the clearest. During the
1990s, earnings restatements, long recognized as a proxy for fraud, suddenly
soared. One study, conducted in 2001 by Moriarty and Livington, found that the
number of earnings restatements by publicly held corporations averaged 49 per
year from 1990 to 1997, next increased to 91 in 1998, and then skyrocketed to
150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively.18 A later, fuller study conducted by
the United States General Accounting Office in October, 2002, examined all
financial statement restatements (not just earnings restatements) and also found a
similarly sharp, discontinuous spike in 1999 that has continued through 2002.19
The GAO Study’s data shows the following trend line:20

18
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between 1997 and 2001. On this basis, it was arguably slightly more conservative
than its peers. See APeriscope: How Arthur Andersen Begs for Business,@
Newsweek, March 18, 2002, at p. 6. In discussions with industry insiders, the
only respect in which I have ever heard Andersen characterized as different from
its peers in the Big Five was that it marketed itself as a firm in which the audit
partner could make the final call on difficult accounting questions without having
to secure approval from senior officials within the firm. Although this could
translate into a weaker system of internal controls, this hypothesis seems
inconsistent with Arthur Andersen=s apparently below average rate of earnings
restatements.
See Moriarty and Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial
Reporting, 17 Financial Executive 53, 54 (July/August 2001).
See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Financial
Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and
Remaining Challenges (October 2002) (GAO-03-138) at 4-5 (hereinafter, “GAO
Study”).
Id. at 15.
17

If the GAO Study’s projection of 250 financial statement restatements for 2002
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proves roughly correct, it will mean that the number of restatements increased by
approximately 270% over the five years ending in 2002.
Not all restatements, however, are equal. Some may involve small,
infrequently traded companies or involve only trivial changes or trigger only
modest stock price reactions, while others may be on a scale with Enron or
WorldCom. Therefore, it is useful to focus more precisely on financial statement
restatements by companies listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq, thereby
excluding smaller companies that trade only on regional exchanges or over the
counter. On this basis, between 1997 and 2001, the proportion of listed
companies on the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq that restated their financial statement
approximately tripled, increasing from less than 0.89 percent in 1997 to
approximately 2.5 percent in 2001.21 Indeed, the GAO Study further predicted
that this percentage would reach nearly 3 percent in 2002.22 Overall, the GAO
Study found that from January 1997 to June 2002, approximately “10 percent of
all listed companies announced at least one restatement.”23 Also noteworthy was
the fact that the size (in terms of market capitalization) of the typical restating
company rose rapidly over this period,24 and in 2002, companies listed on the
NYSE or Nasdaq accounted for over 85 percent of all restatements identified in

21
22
23
24

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Specifically, the average (median) size by market capitalization of a restating
company rose from $500 million ($143 million) in 1997 to $2 billion ($351
million) in 2002. Id.
19

that year.25
In theory, financial restatements could simply be the product of changes in
regulatory rules and this could signify relatively little. But any possibility that
issuers are indifferent to restatements can quickly be dispelled. In the real world,
issuers resist restatements because they fear the stock price drops, securities class
actions, and SEC investigations that generally follow in the wake of financial
statement restatements. Indeed, the GAO Study found that stock prices of
restating companies over the 1997 to 2001 period suffered an immediate marketadjusted decline of almost 10 percent on average, measured on the basis of the
stock’s three day price movement from the trading day before the announcement
through the trading day after the announcement.26 Between 1997 to 2002,
restating firms lost over $100 billion in market capitalization just over this three
trading day period surrounding a restatement announcement.27 Given these
significant and adverse stock price effects, it is implausible to read the sharp
increase in restatements at the end of the 1990s as the product of any new
tolerance for, or indifference to, restatements. Even if (as some audit firms have
contended) some portion of the change might be attributed to a new SEC
pronouncements or, more generally, to a SEC activism about Aearnings

25
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27

Of the 125 actual restatements identified through mid-2002, 54 were listed on
Nasdaq, and 53 were listed on the NYSE (for a total of 107 or 85%). Id.
Id. at 5. The GAO Study also found a longer term market-adjusted decline of 18
percent over the period from 60 trading days before the announcement to 60
trading days after the announcement. Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
20

management,”28 which became an SEC enforcement priority by 1998,29 this
explanation cannot carry us very far. Although SEC activism might trigger some
increase in the number of restatements, it cannot explain the growth in the
magnitude of restatements or the sharp stock price decline (averaging 10%) on
their announcement.30 “Technical” restatements made simply to comply with new
SEC interpretations should not produce these stock prices reactions. Clearly,
such reactions show that the market was surprised.
The available data shows that, during the late 1990s, the magnitude of
financial restatements increased, both in absolute terms (nearly doubling) and as a
percentage of the issuer’s rapidly increasing market capitalization.31 This

28

29

30
31

Accounting firms have sometimes attempted to explain this increase in
restatements on the basis that the SEC tightened the definition of Amateriality@ in
the late 1990s. This explanation is not very convincing, in part because the
principal SEC statement that tightened the definition of materiality - - Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99 - - was issued in mid-1999, after the number of
restatements had already begun to soar in 1998. Also, SAB No. 99 did not truly
mandate restatements, but only advised that any rule of thumb employed by
auditors and issuers that assumed that amounts under 5% were inherently
immaterial could not be applied reflexively. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99, 64 F.R. 45150 (August 19, 1999).
The SEC=s prioritization of earnings management as a principal enforcement
target can be approximately dated to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt=s now famous
speech on the subject in 1998. See Arthur Levitt, AThe Numbers Game, Remarks
at NYU Center for Law and Business@ (Sept. 28, 1998).
See text and notes supra at notes 24 to 26.
According to Moriarty and Livingston, supra note 18, companies that restated
earnings suffered market losses of $17.7 billion in 1998, $24.2 billion in 1999,
and $31.2 billion in 2000. Id. at 55. Expressed as a percentage of the overall
capitalization of the market (which was ascendingly hyperbolically over this
period), these losses for 1998 through 2000 came to 0.13%, 0.14% and 0.19%,
respectively, of market capitalization. In short, however expressed, the relative
size of the losses increased over this period.
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suggests that managers became progressively willing over this period to take
greater risks. Moreover, as the decade of the 1990s wore on, earnings
restatements were increasingly experienced by large, mature, publicly-held firms,
rather than by smaller or newly public companies that might be expected to be
more inexperienced or rash. Managerial behavior within the largest firms then
seems to have changed over this period.

In particular, the GAO Study’s data corroborates this interpretation that
managerial behavior changed, because it shows a significant change in motive.
Although there are many reasons why a company may restate its financial
statements (e.g., to adjust costs or expenses or to recognize liabilities), one
particular reason dominated during the period from 1997 to 2002. The GAO
study found that issues involving revenue recognition accounted for almost 39
percent of the 919 announced restatements that it identified over the 1997 to 2002
period.32 In effect, attempts by management to prematurely recognize income
appear to have been the most common cause of restatements. Earlier in the
decade and during prior decades, earnings management was more a game of
“smoothing out” the peaks and valleys in a corporation’s income flow in order to
reduce the apparent volatility in the corporation’s returns. Thus, managements
characteristically attempted to hide “excess earnings” in “rainy day reserves” in
order to use such funds later to smooth out undesired declines in the firm’s
32

See GAO Study, supra note 3, at 5. Revenue recognition was also the leading
reason for restatements in each individual year over this period. Id.
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earnings.
Despite this earlier preference for income-smoothing, by the end of the
1990s, these same firms were robbing future periods for earnings that could be
recognized immediately. In short, “income smoothing” gave way to more
predatory behavior. Interestingly, restatements involving revenue recognition
produced disproportionately large losses.33 Seemingly, the market feared
revenue-timing restatements more than others because of the apparent signal they
carried that reported earnings could not be trusted. Yet, despite the market’s
antipathy for them, revenue recognition restatements became the most common
form of restatement. At a minimum, this suggests that the interests of
management and shareholders were not aligned, and gatekeepers appear to have
been progressively caught in the middle.
B. Security Analysts During the 1990s
Before any attempt is made to generalize about the motivations that led
managements to pressure their auditors for premature revenue recognition, it is
useful to recognize that this pattern of increased acquiescence by the gatekeeper
to its clients’ demands during the 1990s was not limited to the auditing
profession. Security analysts are probably the only other profession that has
experienced equivalent (or harsher) criticism since the collapse of the high-tech
bubble in 2000. Again, growing conflicts of interest appear to explain their
33

While revenue recognition restatements accounted for 39 percent of restatements
over the 1997 to 2002 period, they were associated with $56 billion (or roughly
56%) of the $100 billion in market capitalization that restating companies lost
over this period. Id. at 28.
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change in behavior.
Some of the evidence relating to gatekeeper failure involving analysts is
anecdotal, but striking. As late as October 2001, shortly before Enron’s
bankruptcy, 16 out of the 17 securities analysts covering Enron maintained Abuy@
or Astrong buy@ recommendations on its stock.34 Yet, months earlier as of
December 31, 2000, Enron already had a stock price that was 70 times earnings
and six times its book value, and had earned an 89% return for the year (despite a
9% decrease over the same period for the S&P 500 index).35 Such a profile
should have seemingly alerted any analyst who was even half awake to the
possibility that Enron was seriously overvalued. Symptomatically, however, the
first brokerage firm to downgrade Enron to a Asell@ rating in 2001 was Prudential
Securities, which did not then engage in investment banking activities.36
Prudential was also believed to have the highest proportion of sell ratings among
the stocks it evaluated.37 Perhaps, Prudential also woke up late, but it is still at
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See “Statement of Frank Torres, Legislative Counsel, Consumers Union, Before
the United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, on the Collapse of
Enron: The Role Analysts Played and the Conflicts They Face,” February 27,
2002, at p.6 (“In the case of Enron, 16 out of 17 analysts had a buy or a strong
buy rating, one had a hold, none had a sell - - even as the company stock had lost
over half its value and its CEO suddenly resigned.”). 2002 WL 2011028; see also
testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law, Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, January 24, 2002 (similar 16 out of 17 tabulation).
See Paul M. Healy and Krishna Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems
in Capital Markets: Evidence From the Fall of Enron (Harvard NOM Research
Paper No. 02-27) (August 2002) at 2.
See Lauren Young, AIndependence Day,@ SMARTMONEY, May 1, 2001, p. 28.
Vol. XI, No. V, 2002 WL 2191410.
Id.
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least revealing that the least conflicted were the first to awake.
How close then are the similarities between analysts and auditors? Much
like auditors, analysts are also Areputational intermediaries,@ whose desire to be
perceived as credible and objective may often be subordinated to their desire to
retain and please investment banking clients. One statistic inevitably comes up in
any assessment of analyst objectivity: namely, the curious fact that the ratio of
Abuy@ recommendations to Asell@ recommendations has recently been as high as
100 to 1.38 In truth, this particular statistic may not be as compelling as it initially
sounds because there are obvious reasons why Abuy@ recommendations will
normally outnumber Asell@ recommendations, even in the absence of conflicts of
interest.39 Yet, a related statistic may be more revealing because it underscores
the apparent transition that took place in the 1990s and parallels the earlier noted
increase in accounting restatements during the 1990s. According to a study by
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A study by Thomas Financial/First Call has found that less than one percent of the
28,000 stock recommendations issued by brokerage firm analysts during late 1999
and most of 2000 were Asell@ recommendations. See Opening Statement of
Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski; Ranking Democratic Member, House
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, AHearing on Analyzing the Analysts,@ June 14, 2001 at p. 1 (citing
and discussing study).
ASell-side@ analysts are employed by brokerage firms that understandably wish to
maximize brokerage transactions. In this light, a Abuy@ recommendation
addresses the entire market and certainly all the firm=s customers, while a Asell@
recommendation addresses only those customers who own the stock (probably
well less than 1%) and those with margin accounts who are willing to sell the
stock Ashort.@ In addition, Asell@ recommendations annoy not only the issuer
company, but also institutional investors who are afraid that sell
recommendations will Aspook@ retail investors, causing them to panic and sell,
while the institution is Alocked into@ a large position that cannot easily be
liquidated.
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Thomson Financial, the ratio of Abuy@ to Asell@ recommendations increased from 6
to 1 in 1991 to 100 to 1 by 2000.40
Other evidence corroborates this picture of a systematic analyst bias
towards optimism. Studying security analyst career patterns over the last two
decades, Hong and Kubik find that career advancement for analysts depended
more on a bias towards optimism than on the overall accuracy of their forecasts.41
Although accuracy did matter, a tendency to be more optimistic than the
consensus of analysts seemed to protect analysts from downward movement
within their industry’s hierarchy, and this tendency was most pronounced in the
case of analysts who covered stocks underwritten by their own firms.42 More
importantly, this tendency for optimism to outweigh accuracy increased during
the late 1990s.43 They interpret their findings as at least consistent with the view
“that Wall Street lost any self-discipline to produce accurate research during the
recent stock market mania.”44 Perhaps, this assessment overstates, but the
conclusion seems hard to escape that something happened during the 1990s that
compromised the independence and objectivity of the gatekeepers on whom our
private system of corporate governance depends.45 Even before Enron, much
40

41

42
43

44
45

See Opening Statement of Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski, supra note 38, at 1.
(citing study by First Call).
See Harrison Hong and Jeffrey Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns
and Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. Fin. 313 (2003).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342 and 346 (finding that between 1996 and 2000, a strong bias towards
optimism decreased an analyst’s risk of downward movement in the industry).
Id. at 345-46.
Participants in the industry also report that its professional culture changed
dramatically in the late 1990s, particularly as investment banking firms began to
26

evidence showed that the most sophisticated market participants understood the
extent of these conflicts and had ceased to rely on “sell side” analysts.46
C. Explaining Gatekeeper Failure.
The same observation has probably occurred to many: none of the
watchdogs that should have detected Enron=s collapse - - auditors, analysts or debt
rating agencies - - awoke before the penultimate moment. This is the common
denominator, not just in the case of Enron, but also in many of the other
“accounting irregularity” cases of 2001-2002. What plausible hypothesis can
explain the collective failure of these gatekeepers? Here, several different,
although ultimately complementary, stories can be told. Initially, this section will
first review two generalized stories: the first will be called the Ageneral
deterrence@ story; and the second, the Abubble@ story. Then, it will focus on
allocating responsibility among gatekeepers, managers, and investors.
1. The Deterrence Explanation: The Underdeterred Gatekeeper
The general deterrence story focuses on the decline in the expected
liability costs associated with acquiescence by auditors in aggressive accounting
policies favored by managements. It postulates that, during the 1990s, the risk of

46

hire Astar@ analysts for their marketing clout. See Gretchen Morgenson, ARequiem
for an Honorable Profession@ New York Times, May 5, 2002, at Section 3-1
(suggesting major change dates from around 1996).
Although the empirical evidence is limited, it suggests that Aindependent@ analysts
(i.e., analysts not associated with the underwriter for a particular issuer) behave
differently than, and tend to outperform, analysts who are associated with the
issuer=s underwriter. See R. Michaely and K. Womack, Conflict of Interest and
the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 Review of Financial
Studies 653 (1999).
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auditor liability declined, while the benefits of acquiescence increased.
Economics 101 teaches us that when the costs go down, while the benefits
associated with any activity go up, the output of the activity will increase. Here,
the activity that increased was auditor acquiescence.
Prior to the 1990s, auditors faced a very real risk of civil liability,
principally from class action litigation.47 Why did the legal risks go down during
the 1990s? The obvious list of reasons would include:
(a) the Supreme Court=s Lampf, Pleva decision, which in 1991
significantly shortened the statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud;48

47

48

As of 1992, Congress was advised that the securities fraud litigation costs for just
the six largest accounting firms (then the “Big Six”) accounted for $783 million,
or more than 14% of their audit revenues. Potential exposure to loss was in the
billions. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., lst Sess. No.103-431 (1993) (statement
of Jake L. Netterville), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1696, (January
10, 1996). One major auditing firm, Laventhol & Horwath, did fail and entered
bankruptcy as a result of litigation and associated scandals growing out of the
savings and loan scandals of the 1980s. See “What Role Should CPA’s be
Playing in Audit Reform?,” Partner’s Report for CPA Firm Owners, April, 2002
(discussing experience of Laventhol & Horwath). The accounting profession’s
bitter experience with class litigation in the 1980s and 1990s probably explains
why it became the strongest and most organized champion of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertston, 501 U.S. 350, 359-61 (1991)
(creating a federal rule requiring plaintiffs to file within one year of when they
should have known of the violation underlying their action, but in no event more
than three years after the violation). This one to three year period was typically
shorter than the previously applicable limitations periods which were determined
by analogy to state statutes and often permitted a five or six year delay - - if that
was the period within which a common law fraud action could be maintained in
the particular state.
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(b) the Supreme Court=s Central Bank of Denver decision, 49 which in 1994
eliminated private “aiding and abetting” liability in securities fraud cases;
(c) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),
which (i) raised the pleading standards for securities class actions to a level well
above that applicable to fraud actions generally; (ii) substituted proportionate
liability for “joint and several” liability; (iii) restricted the sweep of the RICO
statute so that it could no longer convert securities fraud class actions for
compensatory damages into actions for treble damages; and (iv) adopted a very
protective safe harbor for forward-looking information; and
(d) the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”),
which abolished state court class actions alleging securities fraud.50
The individual impact of each of these changes probably cannot be
reliably measured, but their concurrent aggregate impact is clear: they greatly
reduced the plaintiffs’ incentives in securities class actions to sue secondary
participants, such as auditors, analysts, and attorneys. As an SEC study noted, the
number of audit-related suits filed against the then “Big Six” accounting firms in
1990 to 1992 was 192, 172, and 141, respectively.51 Yet, in the first year
49

50

51

Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
See Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). For an analysis and critique of this statute, see Richard Painter,
Responding to A False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1998).
See U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission, Office of the General Counsel,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST
YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995. (April, 1997) at 22 (available on SEC website at
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following the passage of the PSLRA (1996), the SEC found that out of the 105
securities class actions it found to have been filed in that year, accounting firms
were named in only six cases, corporate counsel in no cases, and underwriters in
nineteen cases.52 It concluded:
“Secondary defendants such as accountants and
lawyers, are being named less frequently in
securities class actions.”53
Not only did the threat of private enforcement decline, but the prospect of
public enforcement similarly subsided. In particular, there is reason to believe
that, from some point in the 1980s until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its
enforcement focus away from actions against the Big Five accounting firms
towards other priorities.54 In any event, the point here is not that any of these

52
53

54

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt). The figures for the years 1990 to
1992 were reported to the SEC by the Big Six and include all class actions against
them, which could include some non-securities class actions. Nonetheless, the
number of such non-securities actions seems likely to have been small. As the
above SEC study further notes: ‘[D]uring the period from 1991 through June
1996, accountants were defendants in 52 reported settlements (as opposed to
complaints),...and law firms were defendants in 7. Thus, there seems to be a real
decline in the number of lawsuits against secondary defendants.” Id. at 22.
Id. at 21 to 22.
Id. at 4. As this study expressly noted, this decline could have been caused both
by the PSLRA and the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver in
1994 that ended private “aiding and abetting” liability under Rule 10b-5. See text
and note supra at note 49.
This point has been orally made to me by several former SEC officials, including
Stanley Sporkin, the long-time former head of the Commission’s Division of
Enforcement. They believe that the SEC’s enforcement action against Arthur
Andersen, which was resolved in June, 2001, was one of the very few (and
perhaps the only) enforcement action brought against a Big Five accounting firm
on fraud grounds during the 1990's. See Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, SEC Litigation Release No. 17039, 2001 SEC LEXIS
1159 (June 19, 2001). Although the Commission did bring charges during the
1990s against individual partners in these firms, the Commission appears to have
30

changes were necessarily unjustified or excessive, but rather that their collective
impact was to appreciably reduce the risk of liability. Auditors were the special
beneficiaries of many of these provisions. For example, the pleading rules and
the new standard of proportionate liability protected them far more than it did
most corporate defendants.55 Although auditors are still sued today, the
settlement value of cases against auditors has gone way down.
Correspondingly, the benefits of acquiescence to auditors rose over this
same period, as the Big Five learned during the 1990s how to cross-sell
consulting services and to treat the auditing function principally as a portal of
entry into a lucrative client. Prior to the mid-1990s, the provision of consulting
services to audit clients was infrequent and insubstantial in the aggregate.56 Yet,
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56

been deterred from bringing suits against the Big Five themselves because such
actions were extremely costly in manpower and expense and the defendants could
be expected to resist zealously. In contrast, during the 1980s, especially during
Mr. Sporkin’s tenure as head of the Enforcement Division, the SEC regularly
brought enforcement actions against the Big Five.
At a minimum, plaintiffs today must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a
Astrong inference of fraud.@ See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1012 (2000). At the outset of a case, it may be
possible to plead such facts with respect to the management of the corporate
defendant (for example, based on insider sales by such persons prior to the public
disclosure of the adverse information that caused the stock drop), but it is rarely
possible to plead such information with respect to the auditors (who by law
cannot own stock in their client). In short, the plaintiff faces a ACatch 22"
dilemma in suing the auditor: it cannot plead fraud with particularity until its
obtains discovery, and it cannot obtain discovery under the PSLRA until it pleads
fraud with particularity.
Consulting fees paid by audit clients exploded during the 1990s. According to the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, who was appointed in 1999 by the Public Oversight
Board at the request of the SEC to study audit practices, Aaudit firms= fees from
consulting services for their SEC clients increased from 17% ... of audit fees in
1990 to 67% . . . in 1999.@ See the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Exposure Draft 2000), at p. 102. In 1990, the Panel
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according to one recent survey, the typical large public corporation now pays its
auditor for consulting services three times what it pays the same auditor for
auditing services.57 Not only did auditing firms see more profit potential in
consulting than in auditing, but they also began during the 1990s to compete
based on a strategy of Alow balling@ under which auditing services were offered at
rates that were marginal to arguably below cost. The rationale for such a strategy
was that the auditing function was essentially a loss leader by which more
lucrative services could be marketed.
Although this argument that the provision of consulting services eroded
auditor independence has considerable explanatory power, there is an obvious
reply: those who defend the propriety of consulting services by auditors respond
that the growth of consulting services made little real difference, because the
audit firm was already conflicted by the fact that the client paid its fees. Put as
bluntly as possible, the audit partner of a major client (such as Enron) is always
conflicted by the fact that such a partner has virtually a Aone-client@ practice.
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found that 80% of the Big Five firms= SEC clients received no consulting services
from their auditors, and only 1% of those SEC clients paid consulting fees
exceeding their auditing fees to the Big Five. Id. at 102. While the Panel found
only marginal changes during the 1990s, later studies have found that consulting
fees have become a multiple of the audit fee for large public corporations. See
text and note infra at note 57.
A survey by the Chicago Tribune this year finds that the one hundred largest
corporations in the Chicago area (determined on the basis of market
capitalization) paid consulting fees to their auditors that were on average over
three times the audit fee paid the same auditor. See Janet Kidd Stewart and
Andrew Countryman, ALocal Audit Conflicts Add Up: Consulting Deals, Hiring
Practices In Question,@ Chicago Tribune, February 24, 2002, at C-1. The extreme
example in this study was Motorola, which had over a 16:1 ratio between
consulting fees and audit fees.
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Whoever is the gatekeeper - - attorney, auditor, or analyst - - a “one client”
practice compromises the agent. Should the partner lose that client for any reason,
the partner will likely need to find employment elsewhere. In short, both critics
and defenders of the status quo tend to agree that the individual audit partner is
already inevitably compromised by his or her desire to hold the client on whom
the agent’s career depends. From this premise, a prophylactic rule prohibiting the
firm=s involvement in consulting would seemingly achieve little.
Even if true in part, this rebuttal nonetheless misses one key point:
namely, the difficulty faced by the client in firing the auditor in the real world.
As discussed below, there are real costs associated with firing an auditor (but, in
contrast, none to speak of in firing a consultant). Given this disparity, an
unintended consequence of combining consulting services with auditing services
in one firm is that the union of the two enables the client to more effectively
threaten the auditing firm in a Alow visibility@ way. To illustrate this point, let us
suppose, for example, that a client becomes dissatisfied with an auditor who
refuses to endorse an aggressive accounting policy favored by its management.
Today, the client cannot easily fire the auditor. Firing the auditor may result in
public embarrassment, potential public disclosure of the reasons for the auditor=s
dismissal or resignation, or a probable SEC intervention.58 However, if the auditor
58

Item 4 (AChanges in Registrants Certifying Accountant@) of Form 8-K requires a
Areporting@ company to file a Form 8-K within five days after the resignation or
dismissal of the issuer=s independent accountant or that of the independent
accountant for a significant subsidiary of the issuer. The Form 8-K must then
provide the elaborate disclosures mandated by Item 304 of Regulation S-K
relating to any dispute or disagreement between the auditor and the accountant.
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also becomes a consultant to the client, the client can then easily terminate the
auditor as a consultant (or reduce its use of the firm=s consulting services) in
retaliation for the auditor=s intransigence. This low visibility response neither
requires any disclosure, nor invites any SEC oversight, and yet incentivizes the
audit firm to replace the intransigent audit partner. In effect, the client can bribe
(or coerce) the auditor in its core professional role by raising (or reducing) its use
of consulting services.
Of course, this argument that the client can discipline and threaten the
auditor/consultant in ways that it could not discipline the simple auditor is based
more on logic than actual case histories. But it does fit the available data. A
recent study by academic accounting experts, based on proxy statements filed
during the first half of 2001, finds that those firms that purchased more non-audit
services from their auditor (as a percentage of the total fee paid to the audit firm)
were more likely to fit the profile of a firm engaging in earnings management.59
2. The Market Bubble Story
Alternatively, Enron=s and Arthur Andersen=s downfalls, and the host of
other sudden stock declines in 2001 to 2002, can be seen as the consequence of a
classic bubble that overtook the equity markets in the late 1990s and produced a
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See 17 CFR 228.304 (AChanges in and Disagreements With Accountants on
Accounting and Financial Disclosure@).
See Richard Frankel, Marilyn Johnson, and Karen Nelson, The Relation Between
Auditors= Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, MIT Sloan Working
Paper No. 4330-02 (available from Social Sciences Research Network at
www.ssrn.com at id= 296557). Firms purchasing more non-audit services were
found more likely to just meet or beat analysts= forecasts, which is the standard
profile of the firm playing Athe numbers game.@
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market euphoria.60 But what exactly is the connection between a market bubble
and gatekeeper failure? Here, a hypothesis needs to be advanced that cannot be
rigorously proven, but that is consistent with modern behavioral economics: in a
bubble, gatekeepers become less relevant and hence experience a decline in both
their leverage over their client and the value of their reputational capital. That is,
in an atmosphere of market euphoria, investors rely less on gatekeepers, and
managements in turn regard them as more a formality than a necessity.
Gatekeepers provide a critical service only when investors are cautious and
skeptical and therefore rely on their services. Conversely, in a market bubble,
caution and skepticism are by definition largely abandoned. In such an
environment, auditors continue to be used more because SEC rules mandate their
use (or because no individual firm wishes to call attention to itself by becoming
the first to dispense with them) than because investors actually demand their use.
As a result, because gatekeepers have reduced relevance in such a environment,
they also have reduced leverage with their clients. Thus, if we assume that the
auditor will be largely ignored by euphoric investors, the rational auditor=s best
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The literature on bubbles is now burgeoning. Perhaps the best known scholar in
this field was Charles Kindleberger, who viewed bubbles as “demand
determined” and the product of irrational investors. See Charles P. Kindleberger,
MANIA, PANICS AND CRASHES: A History of Financial Crises (2000) at 7678. See also Robert J. Shiller, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2001); Andrei
Schleifer, INEFFICIENT MARKETS (2000); Kenneth A. Froot & Maurice
Obstfeld, Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices, 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1189
(1991). While most of these recent accounts focus on and assign causal
responsibility to “noise traders,” the account offered here focuses more on a
behavioral phenomenon: “persistence bias” and the tendency of investors to
expect recent exceptional returns to continue.
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competitive strategy (at least for the short term) was to become as acquiescent
and low cost as possible.
Although this thesis assigns some causal responsibility to investors,
themselves, for their own losses, it does not absolve gatekeepers from
responsibility. For example, even if shareholders do not care much during a
bubble about the auditor’s reputation, it is still possible for an auditor to intervene
effectively and prevent fraud, either by refusing to certify the issuer’s financial
statements, by withdrawing its certificate on a later discovery of the fraud, or by
notifying the SEC.61
The key element in this story involves why investors cease to care about
the gatekeeper’s reputation. After all, the rise of auditing as a profession was the
product of investors’ own concerns about fraud and irregularity, not regulatory
requirements. What then caused this concern to weaken? Here, behavioral
economics supplies a plausible answer. Modern economics recognizes that
individuals, including investors, have “bounded rationality” and do not pursue all
information relevant to an optimal decision.62 The Nobel Prize-winning research
61
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Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the auditor of a
public company to notify the Commission where the auditor discovers an “illegal
act [that] has a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer” and
management and the board of the issuer have not taken “timely and appropriate
remedial action” after notification by the auditor. See 15 U.S.C. §78(j)(A). Since
its adoption in 1995, this provision has been seldom, if ever, employed.
For overviews of behavioral economics, see Christine Jolis, Cass Sunstein, and
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
1471 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U.Chi. L. Rev. 1175
(1997). The term “bounded rationality” was coined by Herbert Simon, a Nobel
prize winner, and is broadly accepted by most economists. See 1 Herbert A.
Simon, Rationality As Process and Product of Thought, 68 Am. Econ. Rev.:
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of Professors Kahneman and Tversky has in particular demonstrated that
individuals typically make decisions by using heuristics - - that is, rules of thumb
- - rather than by incorporating all obtainable information. A heuristic that they
find to be pervasively used by individuals and that has particular relevance to the
context of securities markets is the “availability heuristic.”63 It asserts that
individuals estimate the frequency of an event by recalling recent instances of its
occurring (even if these instances are normally rare or infrequent, when viewed
from a longer term perspective). Hence, if the stock market has recently
experienced extraordinary returns for several years, it becomes predictable that
individuals will overestimate the likelihood of such extraordinary gains
continuing.64 In effect, there is a status quo or persistence bias - - what has
recently occurred is expected to continue. Thus, as the market soared in the early
and mid-1990s, investors, operating on heuristics, came to assume that this
pattern would continue. Further aggravating this tendency is the deep-seated bias
displayed by many individuals toward optimism in predicting future events.65
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64

65

Papers & Proceedings 1 (1978).
See Jolis, Sunstein and Thaler, supra note 62, at 1477-78. See also, Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases” in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky eds. 1982).
This is by no means the only way to explain bubbles without resorting to claims
of mass delusion. An alternative theory is that institutional money managers have
rational incentives to engage in “herding behavior,” preferring a common wrong
decision to a risky correct one. See text and notes infra at notes 74 to 76.
See Jolis, Sunstein and Thaler, supra note 62, at 1524-25; see also Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychology 806 (1980).
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Thus, from the perspective of behavioral economics, “bubbles” are not
irrational moments of speculative excess or frenzy, but rather are the product of
the predictable expectations of individuals who tend to assume that whatever has
recently occurred will persist. To trigger this persistence bias, it is arguably only
necessary that market returns have in fact been extraordinary for a few successive
years in order to cause investors to treat this phenomenon as normal and likely to
continue. Such an explanation helps us understand why bubbles have re-occurred
throughout history. Their re-occurrence is explained not by the hypothesis that
investors are inherently gullible, but by the explanation that a period of
extraordinary returns creates an expectation that such returns are normal and will
persist.
Such heuristic biases are not, of course, the whole story. For the securities
analyst, a market bubble presents a different and more serious challenge: during a
bubble, those who are cautious and prudent will be outperformed by those who
recklessly predict extraordinary returns. Hence, in a bubble, extreme optimism
for analysts becomes less a heuristic bias than a competitive necessity. Put more
bluntly, it is dangerous to be sane in an insane world. As a result, the securities
analyst who prudently predicted reasonable growth and stock appreciation during
the 1990s was increasingly left in the dust by the investment guru who
prophecized a new investment paradigm in which revenues and costs were less
important than the number of Ahits@ on a website.
Institutional factors compounded this problem. As the initial public
offering (or “IPO”) market soared in the 1990s, securities analysts became
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celebrities and valuable assets to their firms;66 indeed, they became the principal
means by which investment banks competed for IPO clients, as the underwriter
with the Astar@ analyst could produce the greatest first day stock price spike in an
IPO. But as their salaries thus soared, analyst compensation came increasingly
from the investment banking side of their firms. Hence, just as in the case of the
auditor, the analyst=s economic position became progressively dependent on
favoring the interests of persons outside their profession (i.e., consultants in the
case of the auditor and investment bankers in the case of the analyst) who had
little reason to respect or observe the standards or professional culture within the
gatekeeper=s profession.67
One common denominator linking these examples is that, as auditors
increasingly sought consulting income and as analysts became more dependent on
an investment banking subsidy, these gatekeepers= normal desire to preserve their
reputational capital for the long run become subordinated to their desire to obtain
extraordinary returns in the short run by risking that reputational capital.
Alternatively, the value of gatekeepers’ reputational capital may have simply
declined in a bubble, because investors in such an environment rationally reduce
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For the view that investment banking firms changed their competitive strategies
on or around 1996 and thereafter sought the Apopular, high-profile analyst@ as a
means of acquiring IPO clients, see Morgenson, supra note 45 at Section 3-1
(quoting chief investment officer at Trust Company of the West).
This idea that professional gatekeepers became dominated by persons outside
their profession is at the heart of a recent lawsuit initiated by the New York
Attorney General against five chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations.
See Patrick McGeehan, “Spitzer Sues Executives of Telecom Companies Over
‘Ill Gotten’ Gains,” New York Times, October 1, 2002, at C-1.
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their reliance on gatekeeping services based on their false belief that
extraordinary returns will persist. Under either story (or both together), it could
have become more profitable for firms to realize the value of their reputational
capital by trading on it in the short-run than by preserving it forever. Indeed,
during the 1990s, to the extent that auditing became a loss leader for multi-service
accounting firms eager to sell more lucrative consulting services and to the extent
that securities analysts began to be subsidized by investment banking, each
profession became less self-supporting and more dependent on those who wished
to profit from the liquidation of their reputational capital.
3. Allocating Responsibility Among Gatekeepers, Managers and
Investors
The foregoing explanations still do not fully explain the mechanisms by
which reputational capital built up over decades might be sacrificed (or, more
accurately, liquidated), once legal risks declined and/or a bubble developed.
Here, an allocation of responsibility must be made among the various participants
in corporate governance: managers, gatekeepers, and investors.
a. The Role of Managers. The pressure on gatekeepers to acquiesce in
earnings management was not constant over time, but rather accelerated during
the 1990s as managerial incentives changed. Executive compensation shifted
during the 1990s from being primarily cash-based to being primarily equitybased. By 2001, equity-based compensation constituted approximately two thirds
of the median annual compensation of chief executives of large public
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corporations, up from 8% in the 1990 and 0% in 1984.68 Another measure of this
shift is the growth in stock options. Over the last decade, stock options rose from
five percent of shares outstanding at major U.S. companies to fifteen percent - - a
three hundred percent increase.69 The value of these options rose by an even
greater percentage and over a dramatically shorter period: from $50 billion in
1997, in the case of the 2,000 largest corporations to $162 billion in 2000 - - an
over three hundred percent rise in three years.70 Stock options create an obvious
and potentially perverse incentive to engage in short-run, rather than long-term,
stock price maximization because executives can exercise their stock options and
sell the underlying shares on the same day.71
The key problem here is not that stock options provide excessive
compensation, but that they provide excessive liquidity. This excess liquidity
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See Brian J. Hall, “Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay,” in 15
Accenture Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 21, at 23 and Figure 1 (Spring
2003).
See Gretchen Morgenson, “Corporate Conduct: News Analysis; Bush Failed to
Stress Need to Rein in Stock Options,” New York Times, July 11, 2002 at C -1;
see also Gretchen Morgenson, “Market Watch: Time For Accountability At the
Corporate Candy Store,” New York Times, March 3, 2002, Section 3, p.1.
See Morgenson, “Corporate Conduct,” supra note 69, at C-1 (citing study by
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.). Thus, if $162 billion is the value of all options in
these 2,000 companies, aggressive accounting policies that temporarily raise
stock prices by as little as ten percent create a potential gain for executives of
over $16 billion - - a substantial incentive.
See Hall, supra note 68, at 24-29 (surveying misincentives in stock options). This
point has also been made by a variety of commentators who have called for
minimum holding periods or other curbs on stock options. These include Henry
M. Paulson, Jr., chief executive of Goldman, Sachs, and Senator John McCain of
Arizona. See David Leonhardt, “Corporate Conduct: Compensation: Anger At
Executives’ Profits Fuels Support for Stock Curb,” New York Times, July 9,
2002, at A-1.
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was, in turn, partially the product of deregulatory reform in the early 1990s,
which relaxed the rules under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to permit officers and directors to exercise stock options and sell the
underlying shares without holding the shares for the previously required six
month period.72 Thus, if executives inflate the stock price of their company
through premature revenue recognition or other classic earnings management
techniques, they could quickly bail out in the short-term by exercising their
options and selling, leaving shareholders to bear the cost of the stock decline
when the inflated stock price could not be maintained over subsequent periods.
Given these incentives, it became rational for corporate executives to use
lucrative consulting contracts, or other positive and negative incentives, to induce
gatekeepers to engage in conduct that assisted their short-term market
manipulations. The bottom line is then that the growth of stock options resulted
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Rule 16b-3(d) expressly permits an officer or director otherwise subject to the
“short-swing” profit provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to exercise a qualified stock option and sell the underlying shares
immediately “if at least six months elapse from the date of the acquisition of the
derivative security to the date of disposition of the ... underlying equity security.”
See 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-3(d). The SEC comprehensively revised its rules under
Section 16(b) in 1991, in part to facilitate the use of stock options as executive
compensation and to “reduce the regulatory burden” under Section 16(b). See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869, 1991 SEC LEXIS 171 (February
8, 1991). A premise of this reform was that “holding derivative securities is
functionally equivalent to holding the underlying equity security for purpose of
Section 16.” Id. at *35 to *36. Hence, the SEC permitted the tacking of the
option holding period with the stock’s holding period, thereby enabling officers
and directors to exercise options and sell on the same day (if the option had
already been held six months).
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in gatekeepers being placed under greater pressure to acquiesce in short-term
oriented financial and accounting strategies.
b. The Role of Investors. Investors cannot be fairly presented as entirely
innocent victims in the recent epidemic of financial irregularities. At a minimum,
a bubble reflects investors’ acquiescence in unrealistic valuations. More
importantly, conflicts of interest on the part of gatekeepers that might alarm
investors in other circumstances may be accepted (or at least repressed) during a
bubble. To be sure, many investors were likely misled by biased analyst research
and overstated earnings, but this does not absolve the “buy side” of all
responsibility. Particularly in the case of institutional investors, who account for
over half the ownership and seventy-five percent of the trading in NYSE-listed
equities,73 financial intermediaries may again have failed. According to one
estimate, at the peak of the market, sixty percent of Enron stock was held by large
institutional investors.74 Why didn’t they see that Enron was overvalued, at least
once alarm bells began to sound? A plausible explanation for the failure of
institutional investors to respond to warning signals in the case of Enron starts
from the premise that professional money managers are principally motivated by
the desire to perform no worse than their major institutional rivals; this pressure
quickly leads to herding behavior.75 According to this analysis, fund managers
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For these statistics, see James D. Cox and Randall Thomas, Leaving Money on
the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class
Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 855 n. 4 (2002).
See Healy and Palepu, supra note 35, at 22.
The term “herding” was coined over a decade ago by Scharfstein and Stein. See
David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 Amer.
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attract investor funds and maximize their fees based on their “quarterly reported
performance relative to comparable funds or indices.”76 Thus, if a fund manager
discovers that Enron is overvalued and sells his firm’s investment, the manager
and the managers clients do well - - but only if the market agrees and Enron’s
stock price falls that quarter. If the market persists in overvaluing Enron or
actually climbs based on biased “sell-side” research, the manager becomes an
unfortunately premature prophet, and the manager’s performance relative to his
rivals falls. Precisely to the extent that this manager is accountable to the market,
clients’ funds flow out of their manager’s account to those of rival fund managers,
thereby collapsing like an accordion the funds under his management, so that this
manager does not profit significantly even when Enron ultimately does collapse.
In such an environment, there is little incentive to be ahead of the crowd and
considerable incentive to ride the bubble to its top in order not to underperform
rival investment managers. The result is “herding” because, by following the
herd, the fund manager will not underperform most of the manager’s rivals. Put
differently, the fund manager can survive mistakes that others also make, but will
be more severely injured by correct decisions that the market only belatedly
recognizes. In turn, this may explain why institutions would herd and follow
“sell-side” research that they know to be biased: that is, because they anticipated
that others would follow it also, leaving them in the safe position of being part of
the herd.
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Eco. Rev. 465 (1990); see also Healy and Palepu, supra note 35, at 26-27.
Id. at 26.
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c. The Role of Gatekeepers. This conclusion that even sophisticated
investors will follow and rely on “sell-side” research that they know to be biased
brings us back to the central role of gatekeepers. To some degree, gatekeepers
will be followed even when they are not trusted, because it is expected that they
will influence the market. In addition, there is evidence that gatekeepers “herd”
for careerist reasons. For example, career concerns appear to motivate security
analysts not to deviate far from the consensus earnings forecasts, and particularly
to avoid downward deviations.77 As a result, it becomes predictable that some
degree of bias will distort analyst recommendations (and that such advice will be
followed), even when the market expects inflation. Moreover, ending the most
obvious conflicts of interest (as Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms attempt to
do) will not solve this problem, because the careerist motives will remain.
4. A Preliminary Evaluation. Does it matter which of the foregoing two
stories - - the deterrence story or the bubble story - - is deemed more persuasive?
Although they are complementary rather than contradictory, their relative
plausibility may bear on whether particular reforms are necessary, desirable, or
sufficient. To the extent one accepts the deterrence story, the logical prescription
is legal change aimed at restoring an adequate legal threat. In principle, these
changes could either raise the costs or lower the benefits of acquiescence to
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See Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Amit Solomon, Security Analysts’
Career Concerns and the Herding of Earnings Forecasts, 31 RAND Journal of
Economics 121 (2000). See also Hong and Kubik, supra note 41, at 341-46
(finding systematic tendency towards overly optimistic advice based on careerist
considerations).
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auditors (or both). To the extent one accepts the bubble story, the problem may
be self-correcting. That is, once the bubble bursts, gatekeepers come back into
fashion, as investors become skeptics who once again demand assurances that
only credible reputational intermediaries can provide.78 Alternatively, structural
reforms may be desirable to enhance the independence of analysts, auditors, and
other gatekeepers. Clearly, all gatekeepers are not alike. Thus, the deterrence
story may work better for auditors than for analysts, while in the case of analysts,
structural reforms aimed at increasing the independence of the gatekeeper may
outperform litigation remedies.
Part II: The Near Future of Gatekeepers: Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Looming Litigation Crisis
Historically, bubbles are followed by crashes, which in turn are followed
by punitive legislation.79 The 1999-2003 era is fully consistent with this pattern,
and this section will focus on the likely impact of these reforms on gatekeepers.
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Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has indeed suggested that market
corrections will largely solve the problems uncovered in the wake of Enron. See
ARemarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, >Corporate Governance= at the Stern
School of Business, New York University, New York, New York, March 26,
2002" (available on the Federal Reserves website at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches). In his view, earnings management
came to dominate management=s agenda, and as a result: AIt is not surprising that
since 1998 earnings restatements have proliferated. This situation is a far cry
from earlier decades when, if my recollection serves me correctly, firms competed
on the basis of which one had the most conservative set of books. Short-term
stock price values then seemed less of a focus than maintaining unquestioned
credit worthiness.@ Id. at 4. He goes on to predict that: AA change in behavior,
however, may already be in train.@ Id. at 5. Specifically, he finds that
Aperceptions of the reliability of firms= financial statements are increasingly
reflected in yield spreads of corporate bonds@ and that other signs of selfcorrection are discernible. Id.
For a discussion of this cycle over history, see Banner, supra note 6.
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Initially, however, it is useful to categorize the range of strategies that Congress
can follow in response to corporate scandals and conflicts of interest.

A. A Typology of Conflict of Interest Reforms
There are a range of well recognized strategies for responding to corporate
financial scandals, each of which has well-known precedents. While other
typologies can undoubtedly be constructed, the following four categories capture
most of the realistic regulatory options:
1. Structural Reform. A new body or agency can be created, either public
or private, to monitor conflicts and assure higher quality disclosure. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, created by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in the wake of the 1929 market crash, is probably the clearest example of
such a response, but the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (“PCAOB”) by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to monitor auditing firms is a
modern example that follows in its wake.80
Structural reforms can also change the obligations of private actors. For
example, the law can create a new gatekeeper. In the 1930s, the federal securities
laws and the SEC effectively made auditors into gatekeepers for the public (and
not just for the clients who retained their services), and to a limited extent the
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Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creates the PCAOB as a regulatory body subject
to SEC oversight, and Section 101(c) of the Act further directs the PCAOB to
“establish or adopt...auditing, quality control, ethics, independence and other
standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for” publicly held issuers.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c).
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SEC has already begun to impose gatekeeping responsibilities on attorneys and
securities analysts. Part III will suggest that these initial steps should be
generalized.
2. Prophylactic rules. Fiduciary law has long simply forbidden some
forms of self-dealing between the fiduciary and the beneficiary. Thus, the trustee
cannot transact business with the trust estate, because such transactions are either
void or voidable. Over the course of the 20th Century, American corporate law
largely relaxed the prohibition on self-dealing, provided that certain procedures
were followed.81 Offsetting this trend in state law, however, the federal securities
laws introduced new prophylactic prohibitions, including a prohibition on a
corporate officer or director retaining the proceeds of certain forms of short-term
trading in his or her company’s stock.82 Sarbanes-Oxley has now introduced
similar rules, most notably including a prohibition on a public company making
or arranging for loans to its executives.83
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For a detailed discussion of the gradual relaxation over the last 150 years of
American corporate law of the once standard prophylactic rule against selfdealing, see Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. Law 35 (1966).
Essentially, disclosure to, and approval by, disinterested directors replaced proof
of the transaction’s intrinsic fairness as the necessary precondition to sustaining a
self-dealing transaction’s validity.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b),
mandates that senior officers, directors and 10% shareholders must return to the
corporation any profits they make, or losses they avert, on purchasing and selling
the corporation’s stock in any sequence within six months. The provision is a
federal rule intended to discourage manipulation of the corporation’s stock price
by insiders.
Section 402 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which has been codified as Section 13(k)
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, forbids public companies “directly or
indirectly,...to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for an extension of credit, or
to renew an extension of credit, in the form of personal loan to or for any director
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3. Procedural rules. The core of American corporate law is full of
procedural rules requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest by corporate officers
to disinterested directors.84 Indeed, American corporate law has largely
substituted procedural rules for its former prophylactic prohibitions on conflict of
interest transactions. Yet, events at WorldCom, Enron, Tyco and other companies
suggest that such rules may not be adequately effective, either because outside
directors have too little incentive to monitor diligently or because information
costs are too high. Nonetheless, as discussed below, Sarbanes-Oxley also
followed this time honored path and enacted new procedural rules.
4. Liability rules. The standard response to a corporate scandal is to
enhance liability rules, either by increasing penalties, eliminating defenses, or
creating new private causes of action. The Securities Act of 1933 is here the
classic example, as it creates virtual strict liability for the corporate issuer if
issuer’s registration statement contains a material misstatement or omission.85
Yet, as discussed below, Sarbanes-Oxley basically did not follow this path, except
to the extent that it increased criminal penalties and SEC powers.
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or executive officer...of that issuer.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k). This is in effect a
throwback to the form of strict prophylactic rule that characterized 19th and early
20th Century American corporate law.
For an overview of these rules that require disclosure and approval by
disinterested directors of a self-dealing transaction, see J. Choper, J. Coffee and
R. Gilson, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 2000) at
112 to 130. For a representative cases, see Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218
(Del. 1976); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 creates strict liability for the issuer (but
grants a variety of affirmative defenses to secondary participants) if the
registration statement contains a material misstatement or omission of which the
purchaser was unaware. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
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B. Congress’s Response: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Passed almost without dissent, the “Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002" (popularly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act) essentially addresses the problem of accounting irregularities by shifting
control of the accounting profession from the profession to a new body: the
PCAOB, which is authorized to regulate the profession, establish auditing
standards, and impose professional discipline.86 Conceptually, this is not a new
approach, as the PCAOB’s authority largely parallels that of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) over securities brokers and dealers.
What is new, however, is explicit recognition of the significance of conflicts of
interest, because the Act expressly bars auditors from providing a number of
categories of professional services to their audit clients and further authorizes the
PCAOB to prohibit additional categories of consulting services.87 Thus, to the
extent that conflicts of interest compromised auditors, the Act responds with a
relevant answer.
Yet, if accounting irregularities were more the product of a lack of general
deterrence or the increased incentive of corporate executives to “cook the books”
because of the temptations created by stock options, the Act is less clearly
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Section 101(c) of the Act enumerates broad powers, including the authority to
“establish ... auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards
relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers....”
Section 201 of the Act, which is to be codified as Section 10A(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, specifies eight types of professional services which the
auditor of a public company may not perform for its audit client, and also
authorizes the PCAOB to prohibit additional services if it determines that they
may compromise auditor independence.
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responsive to these problems. For example, except in one minor respect, the Act
does not seek to revise or reverse the PSLRA;88 nor does it make gatekeepers
liable in private litigation to investors where the gatekeeper knowingly aided and
abetted a securities fraud. Finally, the Act never addresses stock options or
executive compensation, except to the extent that it may require the forfeiture of
such compensation to the corporation if the corporation later restates its
earnings.89 In short, while the potential benefits from acquiescing in accounting
irregularities appear to have been reduced for auditors, the expected costs to them
from gatekeeper failure also remain low because the level of deterrence that they
once faced has not been restored.90 Arguably then, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
represents an incomplete response. But this assumes that courts have not largely
filled this void.
C. The Judicial Response
Any assertion that gatekeepers face an inadequate deterrent threat assumes
that all other factors affecting their total exposure to liability have remained
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Section 804 of the Act does extend the statute of limitation for securities fraud
suits, thereby reversing a 1991 Supreme Court decision that had shortened the
time period. See supra note 48.
Section 304 of the Act requires the forfeiture of certain bonuses “or other
incentive-based or equity-based compensation” and any stock trading profits
received by a chief executive officer or chief financial officer of an issuer during
the 12-month period following the filing of an inflated earnings report that is later
restated. This does cancel the incentive to inflate earnings and then bail out, but
the enforcement methods applicable to this provision are unspecified and the
provision applies only if the earnings restatement is the product of “misconduct.”
Ambiguities abound here.
Prior to the 1990s, private litigation was a real (and arguably even excessive)
constraining force on auditors. See text and note supra at note 47.
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constant, and this may not be the case. Although the Congress has been cautious
about changing the balance of advantage in civil litigation involving gatekeepers,
the judiciary may be rapidly shifting that same balance without waiting for
legislative direction. The most obvious example of such a shift is the decision in
late 2002 in In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,91 which
seemingly has outflanked the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of
Denver,92 and largely restored private “aiding and abetting” liability under a
different name. In the Enron case, the district court denied the motions to dismiss
filed by Enron’s auditors, its principal outside law firm, and six major banks, all
of whom asserted that they could not be deemed primary violators and so were
immune from private suit under Central Bank. In response to their motions, the
Court ruled that primary liability could extend to any person who contributes
materially false or misleading information to persons who it understands to be
preparing or drafting a report or press release to be filed with the SEC or
disseminated to the investing public, even though this peripheral defendant
neither solicited sales, participated in the actual drafting of the document, nor was
otherwise identified in the document so filed or released.93 The Enron decision
not only rejected the majority rule in the federal courts, which seems to permit a
private suit against the secondary participant only when the latter makes or
authorizes an “attributed statement” that specifically identifies it and its
91
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235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 511 U.S.
164, 177 (1994).
235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 582-591.
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conclusion,94 but also went well beyond the few cases that have allowed primary
liability to extend to persons who “substantially participate” in the drafting of an
SEC document.95 Under the Enron ruling, almost anyone who could formerly be
reached under “aiding and abetting” liability now seemingly can be reached as a
“maker” or “creator” of public statement.96
Whether the Enron decision is correct can be (and is being hotly) debated.
But the more relevant point for this article is that the decision seemingly signals a
judicial shift - - whether conscious or unconscious - - toward imposing greater
liability on gatekeepers. Moreover, Enron is not the only recent post-scandal
decision to have expanded the scope of liability for secondary participants. In a
series of decisions involving Lernout & Hauspie,97 another federal court has
refused to dismiss securities fraud allegations in private class actions against a
variety of secondary defendants, including the firm’s outside directors, auditors,
stock analysts, and others. Unlike the Enron Court, the Lernout & Hauspie Court
did not need to focus on whether the defendant corporation’s audit committee
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See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring
that “the misrepresentation must be attributed to the specific actor at the time of
public dissemination”).
In re Software Toolworks Secs. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) (using
“substantial participation” test).
For this assessment, see William Gleeson and Jesse Minier, Financial Institutions
and the Enron Whiplash: The Growing Pain of Rule 10b-5 Liability, 22 Banking
& Financial Services Policy Report 1 (February 2003).
See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 286 B.R. 33, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22708, 2002 WL 31662595 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2002); see also Bomberg v. SG
Cowen, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23527 (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 2002) (declining to
dismiss action against security analyst who covered the issuer); In re Lernout &
Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2003).
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members had substantially participated in the drafting of SEC reports or press
releases. Rather, because each director had signed the defendant’s Form 10-K,
the Court found this fact alone sufficient to deem the audit committee members to
have made a fraudulent statement.98 In an even more sweeping conclusion, the
Court further found that audit committee members could be held liable as
“controlling persons” under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Under long-established SEC rules, “control” “means the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person.”99 Although the Lernout & Hauspie Court acknowledged
that outside directors were not inherently “control persons,” it relied on an earlier
decision to find that: “[A]n outside director and audit committee member who is
in a position to approve a corporation’s financial statements can be presumed to
have the ‘power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of’ the corporation, at least insofar as the ‘management and policies’ referred to
relate to ensuring a measure of accuracy in the content of company reports and
SEC registrations that they actually sign.”100 Although this conclusion did not
rely on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which cannot apply retroactively to the facts of
Lernout & Hauspie, that statute only reinforces this mode of analysis because it
greatly enhances the powers of the audit committee, thus making them look more
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2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22708 at ** 11 to **13.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (defining term “control”).
286 B.R. 33; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22708 at **14 (quoting In re Livent, Inc.
Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also In re
Reliance Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 480, 518 (D. Del. 2001).
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like “controlling persons.” As a result, audit committee members would now
seem significantly more exposed to personal liability. Finally, although a plaintiff
is still required to plead facts raising a strong inference of fraud, the Lernout &
Hauspie Court found this last requirement satisfied by the fact that the audit
committee members all allegedly had known that their corporation lacked an
adequate system of internal controls and that its outside auditor had raised
specific problems with its financial reporting.101 Again, on this basis, many audit
committee members could be held liable in the near future.
The net impact of these rulings is to substantially heighten the prospective
liability of audit committee members. By signing a periodic report, by helping to
draft such a report, or by acquiring knowledge of adverse facts as a “controlling
person,” audit committee members face a non-trivial risk of personal liability.
From a public policy perspective, this may be counterproductive because one
wants an active, hard-working audit committee to seek diligently to acquire such
information. Thus, if the acquisition of adverse information were to make the
audit committee potentially liable as “controlling persons,” a disincentive arises,
ironically created by legal rules, for the gatekeeper to do precisely what the law
most desires.
On the state level, some signs of a similar, if milder, shift toward imposing
heightened responsibilities on directors are also evident in Delaware, where
respected members of its judiciary have called for new legislation and an
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Id. at ** 8 to ** 10.
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expanded meaning to be given to the critical Delaware concept of “good faith.”102
These comments have warned that a conflicted director may not be found to have
acted in “good faith.” “Good faith” is a key requirement under Delaware law,
because, in its absence, a Delaware corporation cannot indemnify an officer or
director; in addition, charter provisions eliminating monetary liability for breach
of the duty of care (which most public companies in the U.S. now have) are
ineffective if the director did not act in “good faith.”103 In short, all the judicial
straws in the wind point towards a higher risk of liability, although for the present
the principal target of this new litigation appears to be directors, rather than
gatekeepers.
D. The Prospective Litigation Impact of Reform.
Little agreement exists about the overall impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on civil litigation. Some critics have viewed it as more rhetoric than serious
reform;104 others contend that it is a sweeping intrusion into the U.S.’s existing
system of corporate governance. Both perspectives miss, however, what it most
important: Sarbanes-Oxley ushers in and accelerates a major and probably
inevitable transition, which will move us from a rules-based system of financial
102
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See William B. Chandler III and Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, (SSRN Working Paper No. id=367720) (2003).
Mr. Chandler is the Chancellor and Mr. Strine a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware
Chancery Court. See also Tom Becker, “Delaware Judge Warns Boards of
Liability for Executive Pay,” The Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2002 at A-14.
See Delaware General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7) (permitting charter
provision to eliminate due care liability if director acted in “good faith”).
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (and It Might Just Work), 35 U. Conn. L. Rev. 915 (2003).
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disclosure to a principles-based system. In contrast to Europe, the U.S. has long
relied on a rules-based system in which generally accepted accounting principles
(or “GAAP”) were precise, technical and limited. Typically, these narrow rules
afforded safe harbors from liability for issuers and gatekeepers. In contrast,
European accounting principles were broader, more generalized, and sometimes
indefinite to the point of being ineffable. As discussed below, Europe could live
with this imprecision because Europe is characterized by a relatively low rate of
litigation, and thus its issuers did not need to fear American-style entrepreneurial
litigation.
Precisely for this reason, however, a shift to a principles-based system
exposes American issuers and their gatekeepers to a substantially heightened
threat of liability. At the core of a principles-based system is the notion that the
issuer must not only comply with GAAP, but must make a “fair presentation” that
provides a full, fair, and holistic picture of the issuer’s financial condition and
results of operations. In both Sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress directed the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of every
publicly held company to certify in every periodic report filed with the SEC “that
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.”105 This
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The quoted language is from Section 906, which has been codified as 18 U.S.C. §
1350, a penal code provision (emphasis added). Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act uses slightly different language: “the financial statements, and other financial
information included in the report, fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the
periods presented in the report.” No difference in scope or meaning seems
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concept of “fair presentation” is not limited by any reference to GAAP, and
compliance with GAAP is clearly not dispositive of whether the issuer has
provided a “fair presentation.” Instead, the standard seems to intend that the
issuer provide full and fair disclosure in the form of a holistic picture of the
company that reveals all material financial weaknesses, even if their disclosure
were not required by GAAP.
Actually, this concept of “fair presentation” was once the standard
prescribed by Judge Henry Friendly for the Second Circuit in United States v.
Simon,106 but over recent years Simon had seemingly become a forgotten
decision, honored more in the breach than in the observance.107 Virtually
overnight, however, Enron and related scandals have resuscitated Simon’s
concept of “fair presentation.” The reason for its revival is obvious: Enron
showed beyond argument that a rules-based system of financial disclosure could
be gamed and distorted to the point that investors could have little confidence in
it. Even if newer and tighter rules were drafted, practitioners would predictably
stay one step ahead of regulators by finding new ways to game and evade narrow
and specific rules. As a result, Congress and the SEC framed the Sarbanes-Oxley
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intended by this slight difference in phrasing.
425 F.2d 796, 807-09 (2d Cir. 1969).
No Circuit Court decision that I have found over the past twenty years appears to
cite the Simon case in a decision upholding civil or criminal liability for securities
fraud. The decision has been cited by dissenting judges who believed that a case
should not have been dismissed or overturned. See, e.g., In re K-Tel Int’l Sec.
Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 906 (8th Cir. 2002). The last decision citing it favorably in a
decision favoring private plaintiffs or the SEC appears to have been SEC v.
Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Act’s new certification requirements in terms of the Simon case, and in
interpreting this new requirement, the SEC has cited Simon for the proposition
that: “Presenting financial information in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles may not necessarily satisfy obligations under the antifraud
provision of the federal securities laws.”108
While this shift to a principles-based system is obviously consistent with
the public’s post-Enron mood, it poses significant risks for issuers and
gatekeepers. Cases that might have been dismissed on summary judgment now
seem more likely to survive, because the claim that full and fair disclosure was
not provided is hard to resolve pre-trial. Here, the differences between the
European and the American legal environment become starkly apparent. Lacking
class actions, contingent fees, or the “American rule” that generally precludes feeshifting against the plaintiff, Europe experiences little securities litigation and
hence can tolerate abstract generality in the formulation of its accounting rules.
In contrast, U.S. issuers are likely to encounter greater difficulty in any transition
to accounting principles framed in broad brush strokes. The combination of broad
disclosure obligations and a legal environment that encourages class litigation
means both a higher volume of litigation and higher settlement values to claims
against gatekeepers and outside directors.
Nonetheless, this transition appears inevitable, not only because of recent
scandals, but because of globalization as well. Globalization necessitates a
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common, world-wide accounting language. Under their “Norwalk treaty,” the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) and the International
Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) are committed to developing international
accounting standards that both U.S. and European regulators will accept.109
Europe has little interest in moving towards a rule-based regime, and the FASB
cannot credibly push in this direction after Enron. As a result, the development of
a common global accounting language will likely finish what Enron started:
namely, the demise of a rules-based system.
So where do these trends leave us? The original issue was what level of
legal threat would optimize deterrence. Too high a level of liability may cause
the contemporary markets for gatekeeping services to fail, and too low a level
invites future Enrons. This recognition has two implications that inform Part III.
First, public policy should attempt to focus liability rules so that they punish
laxity, but do not employ an overwhelming level of deterrence. Second, to the
extent that it is impossible to define on a practical level the optimal level of legal
threat and to the extent that courts appear to be increasing that threat on their own
today, other types of legal rules - - structural, prophylactic and procedural - - may
merit greater attention and should be blended into any overall policy response.
Part III. The Future Gatekeeper: Remedies for Gatekeeper Failure.
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The two bodies - - the FASB and the IASB - - announced in October, 2002, that
they were committed to achieving convergence between their respective
accounting standards by 2005 with an initial exposure draft being scheduled for
late 2003. See “Convergence of Global Accounting Standards; Regulatory
Watch,” Accounting Today, January 25, 2003, at p. 512 (describing memorandum
of understanding between the two bodies).
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Three linked problems dominate any attempt to redefine the role or
restructure the obligations and liabilities of market gatekeepers:
First, public policy must strike an appropriate balance between excessive
liability and an inadequate legal threat. Precise calibrations are probably
impossible because volatile, exogenous factors - - such as the public’s mood,
including both its skepticism of corporate actors and its desire for retribution - can quickly change the actual legal threat faced by gatekeepers. This is a
uniquely American problem because the prospect of large class actions and jury
decision-making is almost unique to the American legal system. On the practical
political level, the most relevant and plausible reform would be to increase the
legal threat that gatekeepers face by restoring “aiding and abetting” liability. Yet,
if this were done at the same time as public (or judicial) attitudes became more
skeptical of the business community generally (and gatekeepers specifically), the
result arguably might be to generate overdeterrence. The dilemma here is that if
the gatekeeper faces excessive risks that it cannot pass on to the client in its fees,
the market for gatekeeping services may simply fail. That is, established firms
would cease to offer auditing services, and only smaller, less risk averse firms
would undertake this role, gambling that they could reap a high return before
litigation destroyed them.
Second, public policy must eliminate or minimize the impact of perverse
incentives that give the gatekeeper an incentive not to investigate. For example,
in securities litigation against auditors, the defense is frequently raised by the
auditors that they were deceived by corrupt managements on whom they had
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justifiably relied. Often, this may be true, but it can still create an incentive not to
inquire too closely - - lest one acquire information that should place one on
notice. More generally, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act requires a
particularized pleading at the outset of the case that gives rise to a “strong
inference of fraud.”110 In the case of accountants, this standard means that more
than reckless indifference must be shown and as of the very outset of the action,
when typically little is known about the accountant’s involvement. As a result,
the auditor who remains ignorant of the fraud, even though reckless inattentive,
probably escapes liability.
But how much can we realistically expect of the auditor? Auditors have
long argued that there is an “expectations gap” between what the public wants to
do and their actual capacity.111 This expectations gap is greatest, they assert,
when it comes to the ability of auditors to detect fraud or illegal acts.112 Of
course, any profession has a collective self-interest in reducing its own risk of
liability or public criticism. Still, the result may be that the accounting industry
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See Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78u-3
(requiring complaint to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).
For an overview of asserted “expectations gap,” see Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin,
and Lynda Hamilton, At the Interface of Law and Accounting: An Examination of
a Trend Toward a Reduction In the Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties in
the Common Law Countries, 37 Am. Bus. L. J. 171, 215-217 (2000) (discussing
the “expectations gap”); see also Brenda Porter, An Empirical Study of the Audit
Expectation-Performance Gap, 24 Acct. & Bus. Res. 49 (1993).
Over 70% of investors questioned in one survey expected absolute assurance that
material misstatements due to fraud would be detected. See Marc Epstein &
Marshall Geiger, Investor Views of Audit Assurance: Recent Evidence of the
Expectations Gap, J. Acct. (Jan., 1994) at 60.
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spends great time, effort, and expense in seeking to reduce the public’s
expectation that it should be able to detect fraud, rather than single-mindedly
enhancing its capacity to do so. Courts in turn devote considerable time and
resources seeking to distinguish those cases in which the auditor knew of the
fraud from those in which it was merely negligent. This effort may, however, be
socially wasteful if an alternative legal regime could be designed under which
auditors were held liable for any undetected fraud without exposing them to
penalties that caused the market to fail. Such an alternative system would be
superior both because (i) it would not require courts to make often difficult and
costly determinations as to whether the auditor was complicit in the fraud or
merely negligent and (ii) it would maximize the auditor’s incentive to detect fraud
(as opposed to explaining it away as undetectable). Of course, any shift in this
direction of strict or negligence based liability also increases the prospect that the
market for auditing services might collapse under the weight of excessive liability
- - unless a ceiling is placed on damages.
Third, public policy must also strike an acceptable balance between the
obligation of client loyalty and the role of protecting the integrity of the market.
This is the unique problem associated with asserting that securities attorneys owe
gatekeeper obligations - - either legal or ethical - - to investors, as well as to their
clients. Defenders of the traditional advocacy role of the lawyer find this conflict
unbridgeable, and argue that imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys will
simply “dry up” the free flow of information between attorney and client, thus
possibly resulting in greater illegality. This section finds this claim to be
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unsupportable. Rather, it concludes that the primary consequence of imposing
gatekeeper obligations on attorneys will be to increase their leverage over their
clients.
a. Striking the Balance on Liability. On the theoretical level, some
commentators have proposed that gatekeepers should be held strictly liable for
client misconduct.113 Under such a system, for example, an auditor would pay
damages whenever its client, the issuer, made a material misrepresentation or
omission in its financial statements, without regard to whether the auditor knew,
or was negligent in failing to detect, the misrepresentation or omission. The
rationale for such a strict liability system is that it will induce auditors to
implement the optimal combination of auditing, bonding, and other measures to
detect financial irregularities (whether or not fraudulent) without imposing the
considerable burden on courts that our current fault-based system does.114
Obviously, under such a system, gatekeepers will raise their fees, but this increase
is presented as one of the attractions of this approach because it forces the client
that cannot convince its auditor that it presents a low risk of fraud or material
error to bear a higher fee. In a perfect market, the issuer would thus bear the
expected social cost of the fraud, which would in turn imply that the only issuers
that could access the market would be “those for whom the value of the public
113
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Frank Partnoy has proposed such a strict liability regime for underwriters,
auditors and attorneys in light of Enron. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the
Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 Wash. U. L.
Q. U91 (2001). See also Assaf Hamdani, Assessing Gatekeeper Liability
(Harvard Law and Econ. Working Paper 2003).
See Partnoy, supra note 113, at 514.
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financing exceeds the harm caused by fraud.”115 Put more simply, very high audit
fees should tend to deter the fraudulent actor.
Although possibly optimal in theory, enormous problems surround
implementation of any such proposal. First, as even its proponents acknowledge,
the gatekeeper may not be able to distinguish ex ante the “honest” client from the
“fraudulent” one. Hence, it will charge both a single common fee - - but a much
higher one. Predictably, this inflated fee structure will allow the “fraudulent”
client still to access the market, but may well drive many honest clients from the
market.116 Even if we relax this assumption and assume that some broad risk
classifications could be made, it still remains true that, to the extent these
classifications are broad and general, then some clients within each category will
pay too little and others too much.
Moreover, the increase in audit fees would have to be enormous in order
to enable auditors to survive under a regime of strict liability. During the collapse
of the high tech bubble in 2000 and 2001, publicly held firms audited by the Big
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See Hamdani, supra note 113, at 6. This analysis rests on a broader economic
analysis that sees strict liability as superior to negligence-based liability in two
respects: first, strict liability gives the principal actors optimal incentives to
comply with legal requirements, while freeing courts from the need to make
imperfect and error-prone liability determinations, and, second, it induces the
principal actors to adopt an optimal level of activity. See Steven Shavell,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 6-7 (1987).
This is, of course, the core consequence of a “lemons market” in which the
quality of the product cannot be easily determined. See George Akerlot, The
Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J.
Econ. 488 (1970).
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Five fell by over $1 trillion in market value.117 Under a strict liability regime, the
auditor would be jointly and severally liable for this amount with the issuer, at
least if a material misrepresentation or omission were shown. To protect itself
against such exposure, the auditor would need to charge a fee that funded its
expected liability costs - - which loss could potentially reach into the tens of
billions of dollars.118 Most clients could simply not pay such an amount, and all
would oppose such a fee increase with sufficient vigor as to make the adoption of
strict liability politically infeasible.
Given the risk of being rendered insolvent by a single client, some
auditors also might simply cease to offer auditing services. Conceivably, their
position in the market might be filled by smaller, risk-preferring “fly-by-night”
firms that would hope to charge very high fees for the short-term and then
liquidate on an adverse determination (and protect their partners’ assets through
use of limited liability organizational forms, such as the limited liability company
or partnership).
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Indeed, one survey of 33 public firms that restated their earnings finds that the
Big Five audited companies that fell in value by roughly $1.3 trillion. See
Stephen Taub, “Big Five Gets Low Grades For Performance,” Economist.com,
July 12, 2002 (noting fall from $1.8 trillion to only $527 billion in market
capitalization).
Of course, securities class actions today settle for a fraction of their asserted
losses. But this fraction will certainly rise (and steeply) if we moved to a strict
liability regime. Even today, neutral third parties have placed the likely
settlement value of some outstanding securities class actions at $1 billion or
higher. See Martin Peers, “Suits Cloud AOL’s Optimism; Cost of Settling Holder
Litigation May Hurt Effort to Cut Debt,” Wall St. J., May 1, 2003, at B2
(estimating settlement cost of securities class action against AOL Time Warner
Inc. at $1 billion).
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Finally, there still remains the possibility of litigation error. Even under a
regime of strict liability, it would still be necessary to show that the issuer made a
material misrepresentation or omission before the auditor could be held
vicariously liable.119 Given the potential of stock price drops resulting in damages
of $100 billion or more, this means that litigation errors would be bankrupting to
the auditor, which in turn means that the auditor would be under great pressure to
settle such litigation. Such pressure in turn exacerbates the problem of
“extortionate” or “frivolous” litigation. Stock prices can fall for a variety of
reasons that are unrelated to fraud or misrepresentation. Yet, if the stock price
decline is great enough, an almost irresistible incentive arises for the plaintiff’s
attorney to sue, as it has now been freed from the burden of alleging, pleading, or
proving fraud or scienter. Hence, the prospect of “frivolous” or “extortionate”
litigation increases in direct proportion to the degree to which one moves toward
a strict liability regime.
b. Designing a “Stricter” Liability Approach: A Proposal. For all these
reasons, the “real world” issue becomes whether a second-best substitute can be
devised for a strict liability regime that sidesteps or minimizes the foregoing
problems. The most practical means to this end may be to convert the gatekeeper
into the functional equivalent of an insurer, but one who backs its own
certification with an insurance policy that was capped at a realistic level. As a
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In addition, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove loss causation, as
otherwise in its absence the plaintiff would receive a seeming windfall. Thus,
some complex litigation issues will still remain.
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result, the gatekeeper’s liability would be divorced from any showing of fault, but
would also be limited to a level that achieves adequate deterrence without causing
the market for gatekeeping services to unravel. Under this approach, for example,
if the corporate client were found liable for $100 million, then the auditor would
have to contribute toward that liability up to the amount of its policy. The one
mandatory element in this proposal would be that the minimum floor on the
gatekeeper’s insurance policy would have to be an adequate multiple of the
highest annual revenues received by the gatekeeper from its client over the last
several years. For purposes of illustration, let’s use a multiplier of ten. Now, on
the facts of the Enron case, where it has been widely reported that Arthur
Andersen received roughly $52 million from Enron in its final year, Andersen’s
liability would be not less than $520 million (i.e., $52 million times ten). This is
a large number, but it does not approach the roughly $87 billion loss in market
capitalization that Enron experienced and for which Andersen could conceivably
be held liable under a strict liability regime. In a more typical cases where the
auditor receives only a $2 million audit fee from the client, the damages would be
reduced to only $20 million. Hence, the market for gatekeeping services could
easily function under this proposal. The auditor might also purchase insurance to
cover its exposure, but to the extent it passed along this added insurance cost on
to its clients, it would automatically increase the minimum required floor on its
policy under the mandatory 10:1 ratio between minimum liability and direct or
indirect revenues from the client.
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Some will recognize this proposal as bearing considerable resemblance to
Professor Partnoy’s modified strict liability proposal.120 Under his innovative
proposal, the client and the gatekeeper would contract for the gatekeeper to bear a
minimum percentage of the issuer’s losses, possibly subject to a requirement that
the gatekeeper must bear some “specified minimum percentage.”121 Suppose the
minimum percentage set by Congress in an amendment to the federal securities
laws were 5%. If so, on the earlier Enron example, Andersen would be required
to pay 5% of Enron’s $87 billion loss or $4.35 billion.
There are essentially three practical differences between these two similar
proposals: (1) Professor Partnoy’s system is essentially contractual, while this
proposal is essentially regulatory; (2) Professor Partnoy uses a percentage of the
damages as its potential minimum floor, while this proposal uses a multiple of the
gatekeeper’s highest annual revenues from the client; and (3) while the potential
damages, as calculated under Professor Partnoy’s proposal, could often bankrupt
the gatekeeper, bankruptcy would rarely follow when a multiple of the revenues
from the client generated the required minimum floor on the gatekeeper’s
insurance obligation. Thus, this proposal could actually be supported by the
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See Partnoy, supra note 113, at 540-46; see also Stephen Choi, Market Lessons
for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916, 951-59 (1998). Professor Choi appears
to have been the first to suggest that the issuer and the gatekeeper should contract
over the share of the gatekeeper’s liability for the losses experienced by the
issuer’s investors.
Partnoy, supra note 113, at 540. Actually, Professor Partnoy does not clearly
insist that there be a minimum floor placed on the auditor’s liability below which
they could not deviate by agreement, but notes that Congress could impose such a
minimum percentage. Id.
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relevant profession, once they recognized that their existing exposure to liability
could be even higher. It thus falls (if only barely) within the range of political
feasibility.
This proposal’s refusal to accept private contracting (in contrast to
Professor Partnoy, who relies primarily on contracting and disclosure) is based on
three considerations: First, some gatekeeping professions (most notably, auditing)
are extremely concentrated, and thus conscious parallelism in the pricing behavior
of the few actors in the industry becomes likely. Put more simply, if there are
only four major auditing firms at present, it becomes unlikely that they would
compete vigorously and accept liability significantly above any minimum
required threshold. Hence, it is simpler to specify that threshold (but also permit
the parties to provide by contract for even greater liability). Second, in a bubble,
investors might not care that their gatekeepers were accepting only a minimum
liability, and thus the disclosure of the contract between the gatekeeper and the
market might have little impact on the market. Third, a contractual approach
overlooks that the corporate client may have little incentive to bargain for high
liability on the part of the auditor. Not only will higher auditor liability not
meaningfully reduce the liability of the client (given the typical relative disparity
in their assets), but corporate managers may actually want the auditor to have a
low ceiling on its liability in order to make it easier to induce the auditor to
acquiesce in risky accounting practices favored by management. Put more
simply, if management wants to inflate earnings in order to maximize the value of
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their stock options, the lower the liability faced by their auditors, the easier it will
be for management to convince them to acquiesce in dubious accounting policies.
The key conceptual difference between the two proposals involves this
proposal’s more explicit adoption of a deterrence framework. Prior proposals for
making the auditor an insurer have relied on a tort law rationale, which tries to
force the tort feasor to internalize the social costs of its actions by making it pay a
higher fee. As earlier discussed, this is impractical, given the potentially
astronomical liabilities involved. From a deterrence perspective, however, the
goal of reform shifts from internalization of the externalities to prevention.
Under standard deterrence theory, prevention requires that the expected
punishment cost exceed the expected gain.122 Professor Partnoy’s proposal to use
a percentage of the issuer’s losses as the minimum floor on contracting does not
bear any functional relationship to the expected gain; nor does it increase the
penalty to compensate for the limited risk of detection.
To illustrate the difference between the two proposals consider a very
large issuer that experiences a sudden $50 billion decline in its market
capitalization as the result of accounting irregularities. Assume further that the
issuer’s auditor had received only $10 million in fees, and that Professor Partnoy
would limit the auditor’s exposure to 10% of the total loss (or $5 billion). Thus,
there is here a 500:1 ratio between the auditor’s projected liability ($5 billion or
5% of the losses) and its own gain ($10 million). This represents overdeterrence122

See generally, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
71

- unless one thinks there is only a 5% chance of detection. In even a minimally
efficient market, however, the prospect of detection of accounting irregularities
seems far higher than that. In contrast, this article would impose a ceiling on
auditor liability at $100 million (or 10 times its gain). Obviously, this article’s
proposal of stricter liability with a lower ceiling based on a multiple of the
revenues from the client creates less liability, but still gives the gatekeeper ample
incentive to utilize all monitoring controls (including closer monitoring of its own
agents) that are reasonably likely to reduce the prospect of fraud or earnings
manipulation. Also, this approach reduces the prospect of “frivolous” or
extortionate litigation directed against the auditor based only on the total amount
of the investor losses. Above all, this approach prevents the market for
gatekeeping services from unraveling.
How strict should a stricter system of liability be? Here, we enter the
thicket of political realism. Pure strict liability might be the best rule, but it is
probably not politically acceptable to auditors. Nor does it seem defensible to
impose a significantly higher standard of liability on the auditor than on its client,
the issuer. In this light, the highest standard of liability that might be politically
attainable in the case of auditors would be that set forth already for auditors in
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which requires the auditor as an expert
to prove as an affirmative defense that the auditor “had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that “its statement
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were true.123 In effect, the burden would be shifted to the auditor in all Rule 10b5 actions to prove its non-negligence and good faith belief in its statements.
c. Implementing the Gatekeeper Role of Attorneys. The foregoing
proposal for “stricter liability” has been primarily framed with auditors in mind.
But should it apply to other gatekeepers, such as, for example, attorneys or stock
analysts? Here, some basic distinctions among gatekeepers need to be
recognized. While the auditor inhabits a relatively precise and rule-bound world,
the analyst is essentially a prognosticator whose predictions about the future are
frequently wrong. Thus, imposing strict liability on the analysts, given their
necessarily higher rate of error, represents a virtual death sentence for the analyst.
In addition, the analyst cannot pass on its higher exposure to liability to its client
in the form of higher fees, because the analysts is not paid by the corporate issuer
(but rather by investors through brokerage commissions). If brokerage
commissions were increased, investors simply turn to discount brokers (or
others), who did not use stock analysts.
The case of the attorney presents even greater differences: First,
functionally, attorneys act only occasionally as gatekeepers, certifying or
verifying information for investors, while auditors perform this function primarily
(and increasingly exclusively). Second, the role of gatekeeper arguably conflicts
with the more typical roles performed by attorneys as either advocates or
transaction engineers for their clients. Third, asking attorneys to serve as
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See Section 11(b)(3)(B) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
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gatekeepers may dry up the flow of confidential information between attorney and
client, thereby jeopardizing the ability of the attorney to serve the client. Based
on these premises, the bar (and its academic defenders) have vehemently argued
that, if the attorney were compelled to serve as a watchdog, instead of as an
advocate or transaction engineer, for the client, the client could no longer depend
on the attorney as a zealous advocate or transaction engineer.124
But even if there is an inconsistency between these roles, what does this
imply? At least in theory, one could separate the roles of the attorney as
gatekeeper from that of the attorney as transaction engineer by employing
multiple counsel. That is, the corporation could use different law firms, one to
plan and structure and the other to supervise disclosure. Obviously, this would be
costly, because duplicative work would be performed. Yet, this is what SarbanesOxley essentially did to the accountant, divorcing the roles of auditor and
consultant because of the clear conflict of interest. Arguably, the same conflict is
present in the case of the attorney. In any event, such a separation need not be
legally mandated in the case of the attorney, because it could be left to the
corporation to decide if it felt sufficiently threatened by an attorney who was
under a legal obligation to make full disclosure that it wished to hire multiple
counsel.
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For a detailed exposition of this argument that the roles of the attorney and the
gatekeeper are essentially inconsistent and that attorneys make poor informational
and reputational intermediaries, see Jill E. Fisch and Kenneth M. Rosen, Is there
Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons? (forthcoming in Villanova Law
Review in 2003) (available on SSRN Electronic Liabrary at id= 367661).
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Although the SEC has long taken the position that any attorney who
knowingly files a false or misleading statement or document with the SEC aids
and abets the client’s fraud,125 it has never articulated a general statement of the
attorney’s gatekeeper role. In particular, the SEC’s recent rules under Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which authorizes the SEC to promulgate
minimum standards of professional conduct for securities attorneys, focus only on
the reporting of material violations of law and make no broader attempt to provide
any conceptual overview of the attorney’s responsibility to investors.126 Although
the SEC has commendably focused on the controversial issue of whether a
securities attorney should ever be required to make a “noisy withdrawal” that
would warn investors of pending illegality, it has ducked the broader and
seemingly prior issue of the attorney’s overall obligations to these investors. For
example, minimum standards of professional conduct could (1) require the
attorney to perform reasonable due diligence with respect to the statements made
in disclosure documents that the attorney drafts for the corporate client; (2)
mandate standards of independence for attorneys performing certain sensitive
tasks; and (3) subject the attorney to professional discipline for negligence or
malpractice, thus giving the SEC a useful enforcement tool in cases where it
suggest misconduct but cannot easily prove scienter.
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See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1995).
See Securities Release No. 33-8185 (January 29, 2003) (adopting final rule
establishing standards of professional conduct for attorneys who appear or
practice before the Commission).
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On the still undefended premise that securities attorneys should serve as
gatekeepers for investors, this article will make three specific proposals. First, the
SEC should adopt a limited certification requirement mandating that a securities
attorney acknowledge that it has reviewed the non-financial disclosure in publicly
filed reports; second, it should establish independence standards for attorneys
performing certain tasks that require them to be independent of management, such
as the conduct of internal corporate investigations for publicly held firms; and
third, the SEC should deem negligence by attorneys in the preparation of SEC
disclosure documents to amount to unprofessional conduct for which attorneys
could be disciplined under the SEC’s Rules of Practice (just as auditors can be
disciplined today).127 Uniting these proposals is the idea that the attorney should
perform a due diligence investigation of the corporation’s non-financial
disclosures that roughly corresponds to the auditor’s role with respect to financial
disclosures.
1. A Negative Assurance Certification. A certification requirement
applicable to attorneys can be justified simply on the grounds of consistency.
Today, a publicly-held corporation’s CEO and CFO must certify that each
periodic report “fairly presents in all material respects” the issuer’s “financial
condition and results of operations.”128 Similarly, the securities analyst must also
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See Rule 102(e)(1)(iv) of the SEC Rules of Practice, 17 CFR § 2001.102(e)(1)(iv)
(authorizing SEC to suspend or censure an accountant for “a single instance of
highly unreasonable conduct...[or]...repeated instances of unreasonable conduct.”
See text and notes supra at notes 105 to 109 (discussing certification requirements
under Sections 302 and 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
76

today certify that the analyst truly agrees with his or her research advice to
investors.129 Thus, managers, auditors and analysts all certify their work, but the
corporations’s principal counsel does not. Arguably, the attorney should not be
able to escape a corresponding obligation, particularly because the auditor takes
no responsibility for the textual portion of the disclosure document, which is
independent of the financial statements that the auditor certifies. In effect,
attorney certification mandates a parallel expert to review the non-financial
disclosures of the public corporation, but the attorney as gatekeeper would not be
asked to perform an audit or check facts in the manner that an auditor does.
Specifically, the attorney principally responsible for preparing a document
or report filed with the SEC should certify (1) that such attorney believes the
statements made in the document or report to be true and correct in all material
respects, and (2) that such attorney is not aware of any additional material
information whose disclosure is necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.130
The real thrust of this proposal is to require the issuer to subject its principal
disclosure documents to the scrutiny of an attorney who would be under a
professional obligation to exercise some level of “due diligence” in their
129

130

See Securities Act Release 33-8193 (February 20, 2003) (adopting Regulation
AC, which requires a research analyst employed by a broker or dealer to certify
that the views expressed in the research report accurately reflect his or her
personal views).
Issues could arise as to which attorney was principally responsible for preparing a
document. The simplest answer to this issue is to require the corporation to
disclose the identity of such attorney in the filing and then require that attorney’s
certification.
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review.131 Today, there is no barrier to the preparation and filing of such
documents entirely by non-professionals.
In essence, this proposed certification simply tracks the language of Rule
10b-5. More importantly, however, this obligation would only generalize existing
practices in the market because today, in most public underwritten offerings,
issuer’s counsel does deliver an opinion to the underwriters stating that it is not
“aware” of any material information required to be disclosed that has not been
disclosed.132 SEC rules would therefore simply be requiring for 1934 Act
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An open question, on which this article takes no position, is whether such review
should be by an attorney “independent” of management - - a term that additional
SEC rules could define.
For a description of this standard opinion in registered public offerings, see
Richard Howe, Rethinking Legal Opinion Letters: The Duties and Liabilities of
Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opinions, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283, 287
(1989). The author of this article, a partner at the New York firm of Sullivan and
Cromwell, properly observes that “such opinions are not really ‘legal opinions’ at
all in that they do not state any legal conclusion but only say that the attorney
believed certain facts to be true.” Id. Precisely for this reason, such an opinion is
more a pledge of the law firm’s reputational capital, which the underwriters
demand. The counsel giving such opinion does not purport to conclude that all
information required to be disclosed has been disclosed (as an auditor might by
analogy), but only that it lacks personal knowledge or belief as to any such
failure. See also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L. J. 239, 291 (1984) (also describing such
opinions); Richard W. Painter, Toward A Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services:
In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 221, 226-27
and n.19 (1991) (discussing judicial interpretation of such opinions). The
American Bar Association has characterized this type of opinion as a “negative
assurance” and finds such opinions to be “unique to securities offerings.” See
ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Third-Party Opinion Report, Including the
Legal Opinion Accord of the Section of Business Law, American Bar
Association, 47 Bus. Law. 167, 228 (1991). Although the ABA considers it
generally inappropriate for attorneys to request such “negative assurance”
opinions from other attorneys, the special context of securities offerings is
exempted, reflecting the fact that underwriters consider such an assurance to be
necessary to them. That the ABA, as the representative of the bar, “disfavors”
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periodic filings what is already done in the primary market for 1933 Act
disclosure documents; the real difference is that the case of periodic filings under
the Securities Exchange Act, there is no analogue to the underwriter to demand
such an opinion or certification from the attorney. Thus, SEC action would fill
this void. In addition, such a requirement would have a profound symbolic and
psychological effect on the bar because it would recognize the attorney’s
obligations as a gatekeeper. Ideally, the SEC should go even further and require
the attorney to certify that the attorney so believed “after making such inquiry that
the attorney reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances;” this would
establish at least a minimal due diligence obligation.
Admittedly, limits need to be recognized on what an attorney can certify.
Because the attorney does not audit its client, the attorney should not be asked to
certify the accuracy and completeness of all information disclosed in SEC filings.
Thus, the proposal here made requires only a negative certification that the
attorney had no reason to believe, and did not believe, that the information was
materially false or misleading. Legally, such a certification would trigger “aiding
and abetting” liability if the attorney was aware of materially false or misleading
information, and it could even trigger criminal liability under various federal
statutes. But its primary effect is to recognize that the securities attorney is a
gatekeeper for investors.

such opinions because of the demands they place on the attorney probably only
underscores the value of such a reform.
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2. Independence. Auditors, of course, must be independent of their client,
and SEC rules have long defined tests for auditor independence. Increasingly, a
new literature has warned that attorneys are becoming too economically
interconnected with their client to exercise independent judgment, as the result in
part of the increasing practice of law firms taking (and even demanding) equity
stakes in the client in return for professional services.133 If some level of
independence is necessary for an attorney to function as a gatekeeper, SEC rules
of professional conduct could define these limits. To illustrate, a law firm that
holds in its portfolio 10% of the corporate client’s equity (or, alternatively, equity
in the client equal to 10% of its own net asset value) will probably be a poor, or at
least a biased, monitor.
In any event, the context that is most sensitive and would most benefit
from such rules is that of internal corporate investigations. Often, such
investigations are mandated by the SEC, and typically the resulting reports are
filed with the SEC. Should the corporation’s normal outside counsel perform
such an investigation? Or, should SEC rules define the level of independence
necessary to conduct such a more sensitive inquiry? Absent SEC action,
individual state bar associations will either do nothing (the most likely outcome)
or prescribe different and inconsistent standards, thereby creating needless
disparities. Uniform standards for corporate internal investigations are desirable
133

See John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 Texas L. Rev. 405
(2002); Royce de R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm
Investments In Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 Am. Bus. L. J. 379 (2002).
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and as a practical matter can only come from the SEC. There is no need to offer
precise rules here, but only to recognize that professionals are expected to be
independent of their clients. Accordingly, the SEC should read Section 307 to
grant it authority to define the point at which the attorney is not sufficiently
independent of the client to perform certain sensitive tasks.
3. The Due Diligence Obligation. Certification is only a first step. The
next logical step would be to mandate due diligence by the attorney in preparing
or reviewing SEC filings as a minimum standard of professional conduct. Here,
Sarbanes-Oxley changes the picture significantly, because Section 307 of
Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the SEC to establish “minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission....” This reference to “professional conduct” would certainly seem
to empower the SEC to adopt rules requiring the attorney both to conduct a
minimal due diligence review before the attorney files a document or report with
the SEC and to certify its good faith belief in the accuracy of the statements made
therein. Indeed, in its existing Rules of Practice, the SEC already holds auditors
to precisely such a standard and asserts the power to suspend or disbar them for
merely negligent conduct.134 If this can be done without special statutory
authority, then it seems to follow a fortiori, after the enactment of Section 307,
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See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(iv) (specifying that two forms of “negligent conduct”
- - either “a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct” or “repeated
instances of unreasonable conduct” - - could trigger sanctions under Rule 102(e)).
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that the SEC could require attorneys to take reasonable steps to investigate the
accuracy of statements made in documents that they prepare.135
The bottom line then is that the SEC is today empowered to adopt rules
that could suspend or disbar an attorney for negligence as a form of professional
misconduct. Negligence would clearly not support a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5, but it may be the appropriate standard for the imposition of sanctions
under Section 307.136 Such a tradeoff - - i.e., public liability but not private
liability for negligence - - again seems desirable in that it enhances deterrence
without threatening insolvency for law firms.
d. Accessing Counter-Arguments: Can Attorneys Be Gatekeepers? Any
assertion that the SEC should compel the securities attorney to play a greater
gatekeeping role inevitably runs into the argument that such a role is either
inappropriate for attorneys or will reduce their clients’ willingness to confide in
them. The first claim that such a role is inappropriate depends largely on one’s
vantage point. Litigators tend to view the attorney as an advocate for, and
protector of, the client - - a bulwark between the client and an oppressive state.137
135
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The attorney would, of course, be entitled to rely on the auditor with respect to
financial information certified by the auditor, as in the case of the “reliance on an
expert” defense under Section 11(b)(3)(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15
U.S.C. Section 77(k)(b)(3)(c).
Historically, the SEC did once hold attorneys liable for professional negligence in
“aiding and abetting” cases. See SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d
Cir. 1973). This is no longer possible after the Supreme Court mandated a
scienter standard in Hochfelder, but sanctions for professional misconduct could
look to a similar standard.
Evans A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1281 (2003) (arguing that the SEC’s up-the-ladder reporting rules inhibit
professional independence).
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Securities attorneys are less ready to buy into this rhetoric, however, and do not
have the same self- image of themselves. For the most part, they agree that they
have at least an ethical responsibility to perform due diligence on documents they
draft and file with the SEC. For over a quarter century, prominent securities
attorneys have recognized that, as a result, their professional role is closer to that
of the auditor than to that of the litigator.138 The key elements that distinguish the
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The literature here is enormous, but one brief statement by a securities lawyer of
iconic reputation stands out above the field. In 1974, in a famous and much
quoted address, A.A. Sommer, Jr., then an SEC Commissioner, gave an address in
which he initially described the securities attorney not as an advocate but rather as
“the field marshall who coordinate[s] the activities of others engaged in the
registration process.” See A.A. Sommer, Jr., “The Emerging Responsibilities of
the Securities Lawyer, Address to the Banking, Corporation & Business Law
Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n” (January 24, 1974), reprinted in Larry D.
Soderquist & Theresa Gabaldon, SECURITIES REGULATION 617 (4rh
ed.1999). Then, based on his description of the attorney as more a transaction
engineer than an advocate, he offered his normative assessment:
“I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those where
advocacy is clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a
manner more akin to that of auditor than to that of the attorney.
This means several things. It means that he will have to exercise a
measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable if he is
also the close counselor of management in other matters, often
including business decisions. It means he will have to be acutely
cognizant of his responsibility to the public who engage in
securities transactions that would never have come about were it
not for his professional presence. It means that he will have to
adopt the healthy skepticism toward the representation of
management which a good auditor must adopt. It means that he
will have to do the same thing the auditor does when confronted
with an intransigent client - - resign.”
Id. at 317-319.
Although Commissioner Sommer never used the term “noisy withdrawal”
in this speech, the same concept seems to have been, more or less, on his mind,
and the elements that he does specifically enunciate - - high independence, duty to
public investors, professional skepticism - - probably are the key elements that
distinguish the attorney as advocate from the attorney as gatekeeper.
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attorney as advocate from the attorney as gatekeeper are: (1) a need for greater
independence from the client; (2) a recognition of a duty to the public; and (3)
professional skepticism.139 Exactly these differences need to be recognized by the
SEC under Section 307.
The more important counter-argument to imposing gatekeeper obligations
on securities attorneys is that attorneys will be unable to communicate as freely
with their clients if gatekeeper obligations or “noisy withdrawal” requirements
were imposed. In response to this claim, it is first necessary to recognize that the
ultimate goal of the law is to achieve law compliance, not to maximize
uninhibited communications between the attorney and the client.140 The norm of
client confidentiality is a means to an end, not the end in itself.
Still, even with this concession, it remains true that lawyers can counsel
most effectively when there is open, relatively unconstrained communication
between their clients and themselves. Hence, the practical issue becomes whether
gatekeeper obligations would necessary chill desirable attorney/client
communications. The stress here should be on the word “desirable.” What would
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See A.A. Sommer, supra note 138, at 317-319.
Thus, the “crime/fraud” exception to the attorney/client privilege makes some
communications between attorney and client discoverable, even though this result
thereby arguably makes clients less ready to confide in their attorneys. The
justification for this result, which applies similarly to this context, is that
communications so excluded from the privilege are deemed socially undesirable.
For the current status of this exception, see In re Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69
(2d Cir. 1999). See also David N. Zarnow & Keith Krakaur, On the Brink of a
Brave New World: The Death of the Privilege in Corporate Criminal
Investigation, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 147 (2000) (suggesting that the
attorney/client privilege is already highly qualified in this context).
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be the likely impact of the SEC’s proposed “noisy withdrawal” standards on such
communications? Here, a starting point for this analysis should be the
recognition that the client knows little law and will almost always want to know if
contemplated action is illegal. From this premise, it follows that the corporate
official contemplating prospective action will still inquire of counsel whether the
course of action under consideration is lawful. Indeed, the more the government
pursues white collar criminal prosecutions and punitive regulatory actions in the
contemporary post-Enron environment, the more in turn that corporate officers
are likely to inquire before they act. When then will communications be most
likely to be chilled? The obvious answer is that the officer who has already acted
may fear inquiring of an attorney if the officer’s conduct was lawful - - precisely
because the officer fears that the attorney may be under an obligation to report
unlawful actions to higher authorities or, indirectly, to the SEC. In short, it is the
“ex post” inquiry by the client of the attorney that is most likely to be chilled.
If one accepts this premise that ex ante communications between counsel
and the client are less likely to be chilled than ex post communications, several
implications follow: First, the impact of imposing gatekeeper obligations on
attorneys may be socially desirable. In a well-known article, Professors Kaplow
and Shavell have argued that the case for protecting ex ante communications
between attorneys and clients is far stronger than the case for protecting ex post
communications.141 Advice before action leads individuals to comply with the
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See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to
Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 565
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law, they argue, whereas ex post advice does not provide a guide for action and
may simply allow the defendant to reduce the expected penalty costs, thus
encouraging illegality. It is not necessary to fully accept the Kaplow/Shavell
analysis to see that its core distinction between ex ante and ex post advice
suggests that we should be more concerned about chilling “ex ante”
communications between attorney and client. But this is not what most
gatekeeper obligations do; rather, they may induce such communications by
making “ex post” advice less possible.
Second, requiring “noisy withdrawals” and “up-the-ladder” reporting also
has a deterrent value that is independent of this issue of whether the initial
corporate actor will still consult counsel. Few significant actions within a
corporation can be taken by a single actor. Decisions made by one person still
need to be implemented by others. Thus, even after the initial corporate actor has
taken an irrevocable step (and will thereafter be arguably less willing to consult
with counsel ex post), other corporate actors will need to be contracted and
convinced to cooperate with the initial actor. They will have every incentive to
consult with counsel because they are still at the “ex ante” stage. In turn,
knowledge that others are necessarily likely to learn of the original actor’s
conduct and to consult with counsel about its legality may deter the original actor.
The modern public corporation is embedded with in-house attorneys, and even the
possibility that they will report “up the ladder” should deter some illegal conduct.
(1989); see also Richard Posner, An Economic Approach for the Law of
Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1531-33 (1999).
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Hence, even if under some conditions there may be less direct communication
between corporate actors and counsel, knowledge that sooner or later counsel is
likely to learn ex post can still deter corporate actors ex ante.
As a result, the principal practical effect that imposing gatekeeper
obligations will have on clients is that a client who has been advised by an
attorney that contemplated action is unlawful now has greater reason to heed that
attorney’s advice - - again precisely to the extent that the client believes that the
attorney may be under a legal obligation to report any misconduct (either inside
the corporation or outside). Thus, even if it were true that clients would consult
less, this impact could be more than fully offset by the fact that it would become
more dangerous to disregard the lawyer’s advice. Add to this mix the likelihood
that “ex ante” advice will not be chilled, and the net impact is to increase the
attorney’s leverage over the client by making it more dangerous to ignore the
attorney’s advice. If law compliance is the goal, such an impact seems socially
desirable.
CONCLUSION
The diagnosis of “gatekeeper failure” made in Part I of this article leads
naturally to a multi-part prescription for law compliance: the law should create,
empower and deter gatekeepers. Deterrence is easy, but it can be overdone.
Thus, although this article has favored a shift towards stricter liability, it has
coupled this recommendation with a proposed ceiling on liability set at the level
necessary to deter the gatekeeper. In essence, this proposal subordinates
compensation to deterrence - - but only with regard to litigation against
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gatekeepers, who are seldom in any event in a position to fund full compensation
to the investor class.
Empowerment is a trickier question. If we are to reduce accounting and
financial reporting irregularities, the optimal strategy must both motivate and
empower gatekeepers to insist upon law compliance. In the case of the attorney,
the first step toward making the securities attorney a gatekeeper should be to
enhance their leverage over their clients in order to enable them to exert greater
pressure for law compliance. A mandatory attorney certification standard,
enforced by a due diligence obligation, does essentially this by forcing the client
to seek the attorney’s review. In addition, a “noisy withdrawal” standard reduces
the possibility that the client will disregard the attorney’s advice or “shop” for a
favorable opinion from the most compliant attorney.
Gatekeeper empowerment necessarily requires intruding upon our existing
guild-like structure of private self-regulation of the professions. Sarbanes-Oxley
already does this in the case of the accounting and analyst professions, but the
SEC has not yet compelled the legal profession to recognize that - - like it or not - attorneys are also gatekeepers. To be sure, law firms cannot be insurers in the
manner that accounting firms could, but their choice is not “all or nothing.”
Professions, like guilds, will predictably resist any increase in their
responsibilities and liabilities to the public, but, if reforms are pressed, they will
lose. Still, in the absence of gatekeeper reform, the certainty remains that
recurrent gatekeeper failure will continue.
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